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THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF USING BIG DATA TO
REGULATE NONPROFITS
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer•
Abstract: For the optimist, government use of "Big Data" involves the careful collection
of information from numerous sources. The government then engages in expert analysis of
those data to reveal previously undiscovered patterns. Discovering patterns revolutionizes the
regulation of criminal behavior, education, health care, and many other areas. For the
pessimist, government use of Big Data involves the haphazard seizure of information to
generate massive databases. Those databases render privacy an illusion and result in arbitrary
and discriminatory computer-generated decisions. The reality is, of course, more
complicated. On one hand, government use of Big Data may lead to greater efficiency,
effectiveness, and transparency; on the other hand, such use risks inaccurate conclusions,
invasions of privacy, unintended discrimination, and increased government power. Until
recently, these were theoretical issues for nonprofits because federal and state regulators did
not use Big Data to oversee them. But nonprofits can no longer ignore these issues, as the
primary federal regulator is now emphasizing "data-driven" methods to guide its audit
selection process, and state regulators are moving forward with plans to create a single,
online portal to collect required filings. In addition, regulators are making much of the data
they collect available in machine-readable form to researchers, journalists, and other
members of the public. The question now is whether regulators, researchers, and nonprofits
can learn from the Big Data experiences of other agencies and private actors to optimize the
use of Big Data with respect to nonprofits. This Article explores the steps that nonprofit
regulators have taken toward using Big Data techniques to enhance their ability to oversee
the nonprofit sector. It then draws on the Big Data experiences of government regulators and
private actors in other areas to identify the potential promises and perils of this approach to
regulatory oversight of nonprofits. Finally, it recommends specific steps regulators and
others should take to ensure that the promises are achieved and the perils avoided.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 2015, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service's
Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division highlighted the new
"data-driven approach" the IRS would take to capitalize on the
"tremendous amount of information" it collects. 1 She was elaborating on
an internal "Program Letter'' released late in 2014 that referred to "DataDriven Decision-Making" but provided almost no explanation of what
this term meant other than cryptic commitments to develop
"sophisticated analytics," to conduct "analysis to identify opportunities
to improves processes," to apply "analytics and research to improve
program effectiveness," and to allocate resources "using a data-driven

I. Sunita Lough, Comm'r of the Tax Exempt & Gov't Entities Div., Internal Revenue Serv.,
Remarks at the Meeting of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the American Bar Association
Section of Taxation (May 8, 2015), in EO TAX J. 2015-96 (2015).
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approach to target existing and emerging high-risk areas." 2 For anyone
familiar with recent technological developments, however, these
buzzwords signaled that the IRS was moving in a new direction with its
oversight of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations in the United States that
could be boiled down to two words: Big Data.
Oversimplifying, Big Data refers to the collection and analysis of
information that is so large in scope, changes so rapidly, and varies in
structure to such an extent that it is not amenable to conventional
database techniques of the recent past, but instead requires sophisticated
computerized methods to adequately gather and learn from this
information. 3 Rapid improvements in storage capacity and computing
power have made it possible to both collect and analyze such data.
While the term Big Data as it is used today is only a little over twenty
years old, it already has developed technological, academic, and societal
meanings. 4 At its heart, however, Big Data refers to the rapid
accumulation of digital data, from social media posts to cell phone
locations, as well as efforts to use such data to discover significant
patterns that inform and improve public policy making, business
decisions, and personal choices. 5
A couple of noteworthy examples have highlighted the potential
benefits and dangers of Big Data. Starting in 2002, retailer Target used
customers' shopping patterns to determine if it was likely they were
pregnant. 6 While Target apparently did this only so it could better
customize its advertising to those customers, it was wisely wary about
how its customers would react if they learned how much Target knew

2. SUNITA LoUGH, TAX EXEMPT & GoV'T ENTITIES DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TEJGE
PROGRAM LETTER FY 2015, at 3 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Program Letter], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/tege_fy 15_program_letter.pdf [httpsJ/perma.cc/HP2B-AVSP).
3. See generally FRANCIS X. DIEBOLD, ON THE ORIGIN(S) AND DEVELOPMENT OF "BIG DATA":
PHENOMENON,
THE
TERM,
AND
THE
DISCIPLINE
(2018),
https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~fdiebold/papers/paperl l2/Diebold_Big__Data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T59X-D4QW] (discussing the origin of the term "Big Data").

THE

4. See Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a
Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMMC'N & Soc'Y 662, 663 (2012)
(defining Big Data "as a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon"); DIEBOLD, supra note
3, at 3 (discussing the first uses of the term Big Data in its current sense).
5. See JAMES MANYiKA ET AL., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND
PRODUCTIVITY 1-2 (201 I), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey
%20Digital/Ow%20Insights/Big%20data%20The%20next%20frontiet"/o20for%20innovation/MGI_big__data_e
xec_summary.ashx [httpsJ/perma.cc/K6GP-MU7Y] (discussing potential positive uses ofBig Data).
6. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
[https://perma.cc/4P7H-G3L4]
(explaining how private companies use Big Data).
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about them (including one instance where a father learned his teenage
daughter was pregnant because she received baby-related Target ads in
the mail). 7
Government use of Big Data can be even more unnerving. Edward
Snowden famously disclosed that the National Security Agency had
been collecting telephone metadata-such as the time and location of
calls, as opposed to their content-for every call generated by Verizon
customers, so that these data could then be analyzed using various
methods to identify certain connections of interest. 8 While Congress
reacted to these disclosures by amending the relevant federal statutory
provisions, it is unclear whether those amendments prevent continued
collection of such data. 9 Other government uses of Big Data methods
include environmental protection and Medicare and Medicaid fraud
prevention. 10
The IRS's Big Data move with respect to nonprofits highlights that
data about such organizations may have reached a critical tipping point
in several respects. First, the IRS's improved analysis of the information
it already collects raises the possibility of more efficient, effective, and
transparent federal oversight of nonprofits. Second, state regulators are
striving to enhance their own oversight capabilities by centralizing their
collection of information relating to charitable nonprofits through a
"Single Portal" initiative. 11 Third, as a result of long-standing federal

7. Id.
8. See Margaret Hu, Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1425, 1452-55 (2018).
9. Id. at 1462--68 (explaining the reasons for this lack of clarity and concluding that "under the
USA FREEDOM Act, it is unclear whether bulk metadata collection will cease and, thus, whether
mass suspicion-less tracking ofmetadata by the intelligence community will continue in an underregulated manner").

IO. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-710, MEDICARE: CMS FRAUD
PREVENTION SYSTEM USES CLAIMS ANALYSIS TO ADDRESS FRAUD 4 (2017) (outlining a
congressionally-mandated data analytic system to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare
fee-for-service program); Meredith Somers, EPA Using Data Science to Save Environment, Support
Agencies, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 18, 2016), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/technologymain/2016/10/epa-using-data-science-save-environment-support-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/32EWGP JJ] (discussing EPA Big Data initiatives); see generally SUBCOMM. ON NETWORKING AND
INFORMATIONAL TECH. RESEARCH AND DEV., NAT'L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, SUPPLEMENT TO
THE
PRESIDENT'S
BUDGET
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2018,
at
46-49
(2017),
https://www.nitrd.gov/pubs/20 l 8supplement/FY20 l 8NITRDSupplement. pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BYL-LKNP] (describing Big Data agency investments across the federal
government).
11. GuideStar, MRFP, and CityBase Creating Single System for State Charity Registration and
Reporting, GUIDESTAR (Apr. 4, 2018) [hereinafter GUIDESTAR, Press Release],
https://leam.guidestar.org/news/news-releases/nasco-guidestar-mrfp-and-citybase-creating-singlesystem-for-state-charity-registration-and-reporting [https ://perma. cc/6KU 5-VWRC]; Registration
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laws, recent litigation, and the efforts of several private organizations,
the data collected by the IRS are also generally accessible to the public,
including journalists and researchers, with even greater access in the
future given the recent enactment of legislation to expand the electronic
filing obligations of tax-exempt nonprofits. 12
The promise of Big Data for government oversight of nonprofits is
similar to its promise in other regulatory areas: greater efficiency,
effectiveness, and transparency with respect to enforcement of existing
legal rules and development of new rules. 13 Additional benefits that
could accrue from the public's ability to use such data include better
informing donors, customers, members, and nonprofit leaders about the
nonprofits of particular interest to them. 14 But as in other areas, Big Data
brings possible perils: bad data, bad analysis, over reliance, threats to
privacy, discriminatory effects, unchecked government power, and other
legal concerns, including constitutional ones. 15
This Article considers what lessons can be learned from Big Data's
application in other areas to inform its emerging application to
government and public oversight of nonprofits. While focused primarily
on the United States, these lessons are also applicable to other countries,
many of which are also moving in the Big Data direction with respect to
overseeing nonprofits within their jurisdictions. 16 The ultimate goal is to
provide a roadmap for fulfilling the promises of Big Data while avoiding
its perils. This roadmap should include measures to ensure awareness of
the positive and negative ramifications of Big Data, to rigorously
evaluate the improvements to efficiency and effectiveness resulting from
a Big Data approach, and to implement precautions to avoid or minimize
the perils it presents.
Part I examines the data and analytic tools currently available to the
IRS, state regulators, and the public. It also examines the data and tools
that may be available to them in the near future, including based on the
experience of nonprofit regulators in other countries with Big Data
techniques. Part II considers the promise of the Big Data approach for
improving government oversight of and public knowledge about
nonprofits. Part III explores the perils of this approach for the nonprofit
and Filing Portal, Single Portal Initiative, MRFP (2016)
http://mrfpinc.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/QKN9-QT2U].
12. See infra note 64 and accompanying text; infra section I.C.
13. See infra section II.A.
14. See infra section 11.C.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra section I.D.

[hereinafter MRFP, lNc.],
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sector, and ways that regulators and the public can avoid potential
missteps.
Part IV concludes with recommendations for ensuring that Big Data
as applied to nonprofits ultimately benefits oversight of the nonprofit
sector without unduly harming that sector or the public more generally.
Those recommendations include the IRS, state regulators, and their
independent oversight bodies rigorously evaluating the effectiveness of
Big Data approaches and identifying ways to enhance the accuracy of
the information they collect and to protect against unnecessary invasions
of privacy and prohibited discrimination; researchers being conscious of
the accuracy and representational limitations of the data available; and
nonprofits being sensitive to the increased visibility of their government
filings and other information. These measures will help ensure the
promises of Big Data are realized, while minimizing exposure to the
perils it creates.
I.

BIG DATA AND NONPROFITS

As a brief background on data and datasets generally, Big Data
datasets are often characterized as having at least three dimensions:
volume, measured in bytes; velocity, measured by how close creation is
to real time; and variety, in terms of degree of structure. 17 There are no
clear thresholds along any of these dimensions that determine when a
dataset becomes Big Data, especially since any such lines would be
vulnerable to technological change. That said, volume for Big Data tends
to be so large that it is measured in terabytes or petabytes of data. 18 To
give a sense of scale, the IRS Director for Research Databases reported
in 2013 that the then-volume of data collected by the IRS in its
Compliance Data Warehouse was approximately 1.3 petabytes. 19

17. See ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA
INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 68 (2014); DOUG LANEY, 3D DATA MANAGEMENT:
CONTROLLING DATA VOLUME, VELOCITY, AND VARIETY I (2001), https://blogs.gartner.com/douglaney/files/2012/0 l/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-andVariety. pdf [https://perma.cc/4BN7-JBD3].
18. See STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: MYTHS
MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 13 (2014); MANYrKA ET AL., supra note 5, at I. A terabyte is
approximately 1000 gigabytes and a petabyte is approximately 1000 terabytes. See FINLAY, supra, at 13.
19. Jeff Butler, Presentation at the Government Big Data Symposium 4 (Mar. 5-6, 2013),
https://docplayer.net/16174543-Big-data-and-analytics-at-the-irs.html [https://perma.cc/8FfA-YN6W]. A
recent new story stated that the Compliance Data Warehouse "has about 40 data sets on taxpayers
stretching back more than 30 years." Vidya Kawi, AI Helping IRS Detect Tax Crimes with Fewer
Resources, LAw360 (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:58 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/1108419/ai-helpingirs-detect-tax-crimes-with-fewer-resources [https://perma.cc/W6E3-AW 62].
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Velocity for many large datasets now approaches real-time collection, as
illustrated by automatic recording of users' searches and other online
activities. 20 Variety reflects the extent to which data is organized into
fixed fields, like in spreadsheets, versus data that is less fixed, like in
emails or tweets. 21
The process of analyzing expansive datasets is part of the broader
field known as "knowledge discovery in databases" or KDD, with the
"process of knowledge discovery ... often subdivided in several steps,
such as: (1) capturing and cleansing; (2) aggregating; (3) data mining;
and (4) interpreting."22 All of these steps rely on "machine learning,"
which is "[a] subspecialty of computer science (within a field
historically called 'artificial intelligence') concerned with the design and
development of algorithms that allow computers to evolve behaviors
based on empirical data." 23 It is this ability of computer systems to
modify their behaviors without human intervention that allows them to
process the vast amounts of quickly changing and various types of data
that make up Big Data datasets. 24
This Part examines the extent to which Big Data datasets already exist
for nonprofits. It also considers the related issue of to what extent the
IRS and others have developed analytical tools, and the potential for the
emergence of additional datasets and tools in the near future.
A.

The Internal Revenue Service

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been gathering data about
taxpayers since its initial creation as the Bureau of Internal Revenue
more than 150 years ago. 25 It began computerizing the collection and
analysis of its data more than fifty years ago. 26 About fifteen years ago,
the IRS started exploring how it could use the data it collects in a

20. EXEC. OmCE OF THE PRESIDENf, BIG DATA: SEIZING 0PPORTIJNITIES, PREsERVING V AWES 5 (2014),
https://obarnawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defuult/files/docslbig_data_privacy_report_may_ 1_2014.pelf
[https://pennacc/JD5M-RGUB].
21. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 5, at 33 (discussing how "structured data" resides in fixed
fields, as in a spreadsheet, while "unstructured data" does not reside in fixed fields, as in the body of
an email).

22. MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW 31-32 (2015).
23. MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 5, at 29.
24. See KITCHIN, supra note 17, at 102----04 (explaining the role of machine learning in the
analysis of Big Data).
25. Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 723-25 (2001).

26. Id. at 766--67.
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comprehensive way to enforce the nation's tax laws. 27 Such use includes
not only collecting and analyzing return information provided by
taxpayers and other entities, but also collecting and analyzing
information obtained from other sources. The IRS now gathers data from
many commercial and public data pools-including social media sites
like Facebook, lnstagram, and Twitter-and plans to gather more
information along these lines. 28 Therefore, the 1.3 petabytes of
compliance-related data the IRS had gathered as of 2013 reflects not
only information provided in tax returns and other filings, which only
accumulates at about fifteen-to-twenty terabytes per year, but also a
substantial amount of data collected from other sources. 29 This
represents an almost ten-fold increase in data during the five years from
2008. 30 The IRS recently estimated that during the ten years from 2007
to 2017 its data volume increased a hundredfold. 31 These efforts are in
addition to other financial-related data collection by the federal
government. 32 Unfortunately, more recent information regarding the

27. David DeBarr & Maury Harwood, Relational Mining for Compliance Risk, in IRS REsEARCH
BULLETIN: RECENT IRS RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE, PlJBLICATION 1500, at
175, 175 (2005), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04debarr.pdf[https://permacc/32QF-RTYC].
28. See Siri Bulusu, 'Doubling Down' on Big Data Upgrades IRS Fraud Investigations, DAILY TAX
REP. (Dec. 5, 2018, 6:22 PM) ("The IRS can currently track data coming from electronic transactions, cell
phones, live video feeds, and social media."); Kimberly A Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use ofBig Data
Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End ofPrivacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 817, 819 (2017) ("The IRS uses big data analytics to mine commercial and public data pools including
social media sites (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter)."); Kauri, supra note 19 (IRS $99 million,
seven-year contract with a private contractor "to sniff out tax cheats by mining data from tax returns, bank
reports, property records and even social media posts"); Justin Rohrlich, The Taxman Browseth: The IRS
Wants to Use Social Media to Catch Tax Cheats, QUARTZ, (Dec. 26, 2018) (citing INTERNAL REvENUE
SERVICE,
SOCIAL
MEDIA
RESEARCH
REQUEST,
(Dec.
18,
2018),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=e832fdd38233b84f8ad65b7fea26eeba&tab=
core&_cview=O [https://perma.cc/N9JQ-WK.62]), https://qzcorn/1507962/the-irs-wants-to-use-facebookand-instagram-to-catch-tax-evaders/ [https://perma.cc/RFC4-98FC].
29. See Butler, supra note 19, at 4 (explaining that Compliance Data Warehouse information
includes third-party data); Eric Lai, Been Audited Lately? Blame the IRS's Massive, Supe,fast Data
Warehouse, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 22, 2008, 1:00 AM) (discussing how data from one year's
worth
of
tax
returns
are
fifteen-to-twenty
terabytes),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2536160/business-intelligence/been-audited-latelyblame-the-irs-s-massive-superfast-data-warehouse.htrnl [https://perma.ccNDE2-5WC6].
30. See Lai, supra note 29 (stating that as of 2008, the Compliance Data Warehouse had 150
terabytes of information).
31. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022, at 19 (2018) (stating that
data volume increased 100 times from 2007 to 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3744.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HYL-URXU).
32. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AUDIT REPORT, TERRORIST
FINANCING/MONEY LAUNDERING: FINCEN's BSA IT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM Is MEETING
MILESTONES,
BUT
OVERSIGHT
REMAINS
CRUCIAL
I
(2012),
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volume of data the IRS has collected, and from what specific sources, is
not readily available.
The Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division (TE/GE) of the
IRS is somewhat late to the party, although there were indications as
early as 2003 that it was considering more rigorous use of data. 33 This is
not to say that the IRS has not previously sought to collect and
computerize data regarding tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. As early
as the 1970s, the IRS had already begun to enter certain information into
its computer systems from annual returns filed by the financially larger
tax-exempt organizations. 34 But the 2014 Program Letter appears to be
the first indication that this part of the IRS was taking advantage of Big
Data techniques to analyze its collected data. 35
Being late has the advantage, however, of benefiting from the
experience of the Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics Division
(RAAS) of the IRS, which implements Big Data projects for the
agency. 36 RAAS is the result of a 2016 merger of two previous IRS
offices: the Office of Research, Analysis, and Statistics with the Office
of Compliance Analytics. 37 The former has been the main provider of
statistics about the federal tax system for at least a decade, while the IRS
established the latter several years ago to house the IRS's data analytics
activities. 38 As of late 2017, RAAS had approximately 350 employees

https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/ig/Audit%20Reports%20and%20Testimonies/OIG 12077.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8T7 5L2EG] (discussing how in 1990, Congress created the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network ("FinCEN"), which administers the Bank Secrecy Act); Steven A. Bercu, Toward

Universal Surveillance in an Information Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police
Technology?, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 394-400 (1994) (outlining a FinCEN expert system that
analyzes financial data collected from government, private, and foreign databases).
33. See J. Christine Harris, IRS Will Enlist New EO Units to Complement Division's Work, Say
Officials, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 150 (2003) (discussing how the new Data Analysis Unit will
assist IRS Exempt Organizations division).
34. John Copeland, Financial Data from Form 990 Returns for Exempt Charitable, Religious,
and Educational Organizations and Private Foundations, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY
THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PuBuc NEEDS 143 (1977).
35. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
36. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX AoMIN., THE RESEARCH, APPLIED ANALYTICS, AND
STATISTICS ORGANIZATION PROJECT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES NEED IMPROVEMENT 1-2 (2018),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2018reports/201810026fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/846Z9FB3] [hereinafter TIGTA].
37. See id. at I.
38. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ANALYSIS,
AND STATISTICS NEEDS TO ADDRESS COMPUTER SECURITY WEAKNESSES 1 (2008) (explaining the
Office
of
Research,
Analysis,
and
Statistics'
role),
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200820 l 76fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM5V -
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and fifty additional personnel detailed from other agencies or student
volunteers, plus approximately 300 contractors. 39
TE/GE expected to have algorithms developed by RAAS in place by
April 1, 2017, to select annual information returns filed by tax-exempt
nonprofits for audit. 40 It also planned to run the returns filed by the
financially largest tax-exempt organizations and by private foundations,
which are a subset of charitable tax-exempt organizations, through that
selection process. 41 The most recent TE/GE Work Plan indicates that the
IRS has not only accomplished these goals but has also expanded these
efforts to include the shorter return that tax-exempt nonprofits with
relatively modest assets and annual revenues may use. 42 While the latest
program letter from TE/GE does not provide much in terms of specifics,
it confirms that TE/GE continues to use "data-driven approaches" and to
collaborate with RAAS in doing so. 43 And the acting TE/GE
Commissioner recently stated that over 50% of TE/GE's examinations
that the division closed in fiscal year 2018 were selected using datadriven approaches. 44
As these plans indicate, the IRS' s primary source of information
relating to tax-exempt nonprofits are their annual information returnsthe Form 990 series-although an IRS official has stated the IRS is also

A9YD]; Nonprofits Decry Wasteful Government Programs, 55 NO. 6 Gov'T CONTRACTOR~ 43
(2013) (establishing Office of Compliance Analytics).
39. TIGTA, supra note 36, at 1.
40. Alexander Reid, Outline for News from the IRS and Treasury (Jan. 6, 2017), in EO TAX J.
2017-4 (2017).
41. Id. at 180.
42. See TAX EXEMPT AND Gov'T ENTrrrES DIV., FY 2018 WORK PLAN 7 (2017) [hereinafter TFJGE,
2018], httpsJ/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege_fy2018_work_plan.pdf [httpsJ/perma.cc/Q8H7-9MX2]
(discussing compliance models developed for Form 990, Fonn 990-EZ, and Form 990-PF); Form 990
Series Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File Filing Phase In, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
[hereinafter IRS, Form 990 Series], httpsJ/www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-whichforms-do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in [httpsJ/perma.cc/MCE2-66Z6].
43. DAVID W. HORTON & ROBERTS. CHOI, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX EXEMPT & Gov'T
ENTITIES DIV., FISCAL YEAR 2019 PROGRAM LETTER 2, 6 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p53l3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M3S-EKJV]; see also DAVID W. HORTON & ROBERTS. CHOI,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX EXEMPT & GoV'T ENTITIES DIV., FISCAL YEAR 2018
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
LETTER
5
(2019),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5329.pdf
[https://penna.cc/EW85-WFD7] (describing "Data-Driven Approaches" used in the most recently
completed fiscal year).
44. Margaret Von Lienen, Acting Dir., Exempt Orgs. Div., Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at
the Meeting of the TEGE Exempt Organizations Council (Dec. 11, 2018), in EO TAX J. 2018-248
(2018); Wesley Elmore, TE/GE Eyeing Changes to Exam Process, TAX NOTES (Dec. 10, 2018),
http s ://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/ audits/te-ge-eyeing-changes-examprocess/2018/12/07 /28npd [https://perrna.cc/K.4KA-SURQ].
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using other, unspecified "external data."45 With the exception of certain
religious, governmental, and political organizations, as well as
organizations included in group returns that aggregate information for a
set of related nonprofits, all tax-exempt nonprofits are required to file a
Form 990 series return. 46 These organizations filed more than 1.5 million
Form 990 series returns annually in recent years. 47 The breakdown by
type of annual return for fiscal year 2015 shows approximately 260,000
Forms 990 and 125,000 shorter Forms 990-EZ filed by the most
common types of these organizations, and another approximately
100,000 Forms 990-PF filed by private foundations. 48 A variety of other
annual return types comprise the remaining million or so returns filed
each year, but the majority of them are likely the very short, ("e-filed")
Form 990-N that can be used by financially small tax-exempt nonprofits.
For example, more than 600,000 nonprofits filed the Form 990-N for
fiscal year 2017. 49 While most tax-exempt nonprofits are also required to
file an initial application for recognition of their exempt status, these
applications are likely much less useful for purposes of detecting noncompliance because they usually represent uncertain predictions by the
45. See Sunita Lough, Comm'r of the Tax Exempt & Gov't Entities Div., Internal Revenue Serv.,
Ernst & Young Webcast (Oct. 11, 2017), in EO TAX J. 2017-219 (2017); U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GA0-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER COMPLIANCE
INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 18 (2014) (describing use of Form 990
data to identify organizations for examination).
46. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033(a)(l), (a)(3) (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ l.6033-2(a)(l), (g)(l) (2018);
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 4 (2018) [hereinafter IRS 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/i990--dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM98-PYNP].
47. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2018 4 (2018) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. DATA BOOK), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/18databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/36UL-24XX].
48. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., TABLE 1, DOMESTIC PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS: NUMBER AND SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA, BY TYPE OF FOUNDATION AND SIZE OF
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF TOTAL ASSETS, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/l5pft)lta.xls [https://perma.cc/6BY3-97NH] (Forms 990-PF); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.
STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., TABLE 2, FORM 990 RETURNS OF 50l(C)(3)-(9) ORGANIZATIONS:.
TOTAL FUNCTIONAL EXPENSES,
BY CODE
SECTION, TAX
YEAR
2015
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15eo02.xlsx [https://perma.cc/D6BL-RQCQ]; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., TABLE 4, FORM 990-EZ RETURNS OF 501(C)(3)-(9)
ORGANIZATIONS: SELECTED ITEMS, BY CODE SECTION, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15eo04.xlsx (https://perma.cc/H8WB-E68L].
49. See IRS, Form 990 Series, supra note 42 (stating that the Form 990-N filing threshold is no
more than $50,000 in annual gross receipts, on average); Natasha M. Cavanaugh et al.,
Recommendations Regarding Incentivizing Universal £-Filing for Form 990, in ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 2018 REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
37, 42 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4344.pdf (https://perma.cc/EN49-46WY] (stating
there were more than 600,000 Forms 990-N filed in fiscal year 2017).
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applicants regarding their future plans, rather than reporting on their
already completed financial transactions and other activities, as is
reflected in the annual information returns. Perhaps for this reason, it is
unclear if TE/GE has included information from those applications in the
data it is subjecting to Big Data methods.
The contents of these annual information returns represent a
substantial amount of data. The Form 990 asks over 200 questions. 50 The
form also has sixteen schedules that a tax-exempt nonprofit may need to
complete depending on its specific activities. 51 Nevertheless, there are
several reasons to question whether those data actually constitute a "Big
Data" dataset as the term is commonly used.
First, the volume of data accumulated annually is likely no more than
a couple of terabytes, given that the annual amount of data from all
federal tax returns-now approaching 250 million, including almost 190
million income tax returns-is in the low double-digits of terabytes. 52 Of
course, this does not take into account the possibility that TE/GE is also
pulling information from other tax filings-like individual income tax
returns of executives at tax-exempt nonprofits-as part of its data
collection efforts, although there are no public indications that this is
currently the case. Second, the velocity of these data's accumulation is
relatively slow because the annual information returns are not due for
four and one-half months after the end of the relevant tax year and, by
requesting an automatically granted six-month extension, a nonprofit can
push that due date until almost a year after the end of the relevant tax
year. 53 In addition, while the proportion of Forms 990, 990-EZ, and 990PF filed electronically has steadily risen in recent years, there are still a
significant number that are filed in hard copy. As a result, adding this
information to the IRS' s electronic database is further delayed. 54 Third,
and finally, there is limited variety; most of the data are "structured" in

50. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018 FORM 990, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl'f990.pdf
(https ://perma.ccN2CK-KUZB].
51. See id.

52. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK, supra note 47, at 4 (stating the number of
returns filed with the IRS for fiscal years 2016 and 2017); Lai, supra note 29 (noting that data from
one year's worth of tax returns are fifteen to twenty terabytes).
53. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8868 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8868.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKS9-XS2F]. The extension is not available for nonprofits
planning to file a Form 990-N. Id. at 2.
54. See Cavanaugh et al., supra note 49, at 39 (discussing how "roughly 57 percent of all Forms 990 and
990-EZ were filed electronically'' for fiscal year 2017); IRS 990 E-Filer Database, GrrHUB,
https://github.com/Nonprofit-Open-Data-Collective/irs-990-efiler-database [httpsJ/perma.cc/3QLL-XLA9]
(stating that approximately 60,000 Forms 990-PF were filed electronically for calendar year 2016).
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that they track the fields used in the 990 series forms, although the forms
do have some questions that require more unstructured, narrative
responses. 55 And unlike the more general IRS data collection efforts, it is
not clear that TE/GE is currently collecting a significant amount of data
from sources other than IRS filings by tax-exempt nonprofits. 56
It also remains unknown whether the IRS is deploying machine
learning techniques to analyze the data, as opposed to human-developed
and fixed algorithms. That is not to say that machine learning is
necessarily required to analyze every dataset effectively, but to the
extent Big Data methods might be fruitful, it is uncertain whether the
IRS has begun deploying them in this area, buzzwords
notwithstanding. 57 By comparison, as early as 2004 the IRS Statistics of
Income Division published a research paper describing its use of a
"Support Vector Machine" algorithm that learned over time how to
better recognize indicators of tax abuse in business and individual
returns. 58
So TE/GE may not yet be truly using a "Big Data" approach to
regulate tax-exempt nonprofits. However, given the use of a Big Data
approach by the broader IRS, it likely is only a matter of time before
TE/GE begins using the same methods-including harvesting significant
amounts of data from sources beyond IRS filings and deploying machine
learning techniques for analysis purposes. This application would be
consistent with the IRS's increasing reliance on Big Data, broadly; one
commentator predicts that over the next twenty-five years, the IRS likely
will substantially increase its gathering of information from sources
beyond IRS filings in order to reduce the compliance burden on
taxpayers and the compliance gap in terms of owed but unpaid taxes. 59
Other commentators have noted that there are various indications the
IRS is already gathering outside data, including the agency's purchase of
cell phone tracking technology, 60 its disclosure in response to a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request that it had been reading taxpayers'
private emails without a warrant,6 1 and its disclosure in response to
55. See supra notes 46 and 50.
56. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing general IRS external data collection).
57. See, e.g., HORTON & CHOI, supra note 43, at 5 (mentioning only "compliance models," risk
identification, and collaboration with RAAS).
58. DeBarr & Harwood, supra note 27, at 178.
59. Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, 17
(2015).

YALE

J.L. &

TECH.

319, 340

60. Houser & Sanders, supra note 28, at 822.
61. Id. at 823 (noting that the IRS apparently ended this practice after congressional scrutiny).
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another FOIA request that it collects information from social media sites
such as Facebook using automated "spiders."62 Given sufficient time and
resources, these same techniques could be applied to tax-exempt
nonprofits, and also to individuals and other entities associated with
them. While tax-exempt nonprofits generally do not owe income taxes,
in exchange for the tax benefits they enjoy they may be subject to a
number of legal restrictions that the IRS is required to enforce, including
a reasonableness requirement for financial transactions with insiders, a
more general prohibition on undue private benefit, and limitations on
lobbying and election-related activities. 63
Furthermore, Congress recently enacted legislation that mandates
electronic filing for all required annual retums. 64 Previously only
relatively large tax-exempt nonprofits were required to file the Form 990
electronically, although the Form 990-N filed by relatively small taxexempt nonprofits must be filed electronically. 65 A broader e-filing
requirement will marginally increase the velocity of the data from annual
returns. It also will increase public access to this information, as detailed
later in this Part. There has been significant government and nonprofit
support for this broader requirement, including from the Advisory
Committee for TE/GE. 66

62. Id. at 823-24.
63. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (2012) (regarding conditions relating to the ability to receive taxdeductible charitable contributions), 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (regarding conditions relating to exemption
from income taxes), 26 U.S.C. § 4911-4912 (regarding excise taxes imposed because of excessive
lobbying by charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits), § 4940-4946 (regarding restrictions on private
foundations, a subset of charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits), § 4955 (regarding excise taxes imposed
because of election-related activities by charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits), § 4958 (regarding excise
taxes on "excess benefit transactions" between certain tax-exempt nonprofits and insiders).
64. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, H.R. 3151, 116th Cong.§ 3101 (2019). Previous, failed attempts
to require electronic filing included Retirement, Savings, and Other Tax Relief Act of 2018, H.R.
88, 115th Cong. § 3101 (Rules Committee Print 115-85, Text of the House Amendment to the
Senate Amendment to H.R. 88, 2018); H.R. 5443, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018); H.R. 1, 114th Cong.
§ 6004 (2014).
65. See Cavanaugh et al., supra note 49, at 42 (stating total assets of $10 million or more and that
file at least 250 returns, such as wage reporting Form W-2, annually).
66. See id. at 39 (Advisory Committee support); Lloyd H. Mayer, "The Better Part of Valour is
Discretion": Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7
COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 111-12, 111 n.212 (2016) (adding other support); U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, at 34-36, 41 (recommending Congress consider
expanding required e-filing for tax-exempt organiz.ations).
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State Regulators

In addition to the oversight provided by the IRS, states also oversee
the operations of certain nonprofits. 67 More specifically, most states
require certain "charitable" nonprofits to register and file regular reports
with a state agency if they hold assets for charitable use or solicit
donations from state residents. 68 State law usually defines "charitable"
broadly so as to encompass not only nonprofits that qualify as charities
under federal tax law but also some other types of nonprofits. 69 Each
state has its own specific requirements for such filings and its own
processes for handling them-including whether electronic filing is
required or even available. 70 There is relatively limited information
sharing between the states and between the states and the IRS, although
the states with filing requirements generally require filers to submit their
IRS annual information returns to the state. 71 Furthermore, in almost half
the states, authority over charitable nonprofits is split between two state
agencies. 72 Local jurisdictions may also have their own registration and
reporting requirements for charitable nonprofits that solicit donations
from their residents. 73 Finally, the tax treatment of nonprofits-for state

67. See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GoVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW AND REGULATION 301-02 (2004); Lloyd H. Mayer, Fragmented Oversight of Nonprofits in the
United States: Does it Work? Can it Work?, 91 CIB.-KENT L. REv. 937, 938-39 (2016).
68. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 305-06, 315, 372-73 (discussing charitable assets,
registration and reporting, and charitable solicitation, respectively).
69. For an example of the breadth of state law definitions of "charitable," see Omo ATT'Y GEN.,
HANDBOOK FOR NONPROFITS: AN OPERATIONAL RESOURCE FOR BOARD MEMBERS OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS 8 (2015), https://ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/c 1965cd 1-7b72-4c57-a090
f88b9f257a2d/AGO_NonprofitHandbook.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID
=ROOTWORKSP ACE.Z l 8_Ml HGGIKONOJOOOQ09DDDDM3000-c ! 965cdl-7b72-4c57-a090f88b9f257a2d-mml 8ZE3 [https://perma.cc/HD5X-VPFN] (stating that nonprofits tax-exempt under
both Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and section 501(c)(4) are generally required to
register under the Ohio Charitable Trust Act).
70. CINDY M. Lorr ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN TIIE CHARITABLE
SECTOR 14, 26 (20 I 6), https://www.mban.org/research/publication/state-regulation-and-enforcement-charitablesector [https://penna.cc/GEK4-JLUP].
71. Id.
72. CINDY M. Lorr ET AL., URBAN INSTIIUTE, BIFURCATION OF STATE REGULATION OF OiARITIES: DIVIDED
REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER CHA.RrrlEs AND h's IMPACT ON CHARITABLE SOLICITATION LAWS I (2018),
https://www.mban.oqyresearchlpublication'bifurcation-state-regulation-<:harities(https:/lpenna.cc/2QSY-VPHA].
73. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA ATT'Y GEN., GUIDE FOR CHARITIES: BEST PRACTICES FOR
NONPROFITS
THAT
OPERATE
OR
fuNDRAISE
IN
CALIFORNIA
73
(2019),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.pdf
(https://perma.cc/W44U-SPTP] ("Many local jurisdictions in California also require charitable
organizations to obtain a license or permit before soliciting donations from residents and in public
spaces."); Joseph W. Mead, Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 5 J. PUB. & NONPROFIT
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income taxes and also state sales tax and local property taxes-is usually
handled by additional state or local agencies. 74
According to a recent report from the Urban Institute, approximately
half the states maintain a database of charitable nonprofits that register
and report, which may include information from independent audited
financial statements when state law requires the filing of those
statements. 75 In general, the more staff a state dedicates to oversight of
charitable nonprofits the greater the likelihood that a state agency will
maintain a database of registered nonprofits, whether only for internal
use or also for public use. 76 However, the use by regulators of these
databases appears to be limited to simple searches. For example, an
official from California recently remarked that her office uses an
algorithm to identify every charitable nonprofit that reports a selfdealing transaction on its state filings. 77 This is a very basic search as it
only requires determining which organizations have answered "yes" to a
single question on the required annual report. As is the case with the
IRS, state regulators are interested in ensuring that nonprofits,
particularly charitable nonprofits, comply with their legal obligations.
Under state law, those obligations include: ensuring assets remain
dedicated to the nonprofit's stated purposes; limiting transactions with
insiders to reasonable amounts; complying with registration, reporting,
and other requirements associated with charitable solicitation; and, for
nonprofit leaders, otherwise fulfilling their fiduciary duties. 78
State regulators hope, however, to increase their collection of data
regarding charitable nonprofits and their ability to use those data. The
primary vehicle for these efforts is the "Single Portal Initiative," which
aims to create a single website where nonprofits can register with and
report to multiple jurisdictions, reducing the compliance burden on the
organizations and facilitating access to the registration and reporting

A.FF. 178 (2019) (surveying charitable solicitation regulations imposed by 49 of the 50 largest cities
in the United States).

74. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 368-70; FRANCES R. HILL & BARBARA L.
KlRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, at 14-4, 14-5 (1994 &
Supp. 1996); Evelyn Brody, All Charities are Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities are More
Exempt than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 621, 625, 671-732 (2010); Mark J. Cowan, Nonprofit
and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1077, 1205--45 (2010).
75. LoTT ET AL., supra note 70, at 14-15.
76. Id. at 25-26.
77. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233 (2018) (defining self-dealing transaction); Tania Ibanez,
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the TE/GE Joint Councils (February 22, 2018), in EO TAX J.
2018-97 (2018).
78. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 305--06, 370; LoTT ET AL., supra note 70, at 1-2.
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information for all of the states involved. 79 While this project has been
on the drawing board for many years, it recently gained new momentum
with the retention of two private vendors to implement the project, and a
recent announcement included plans to fully launch it by the end of
2018. 80 However, as of January 2019, it was only active in a pilot phase
for two states. 81 State officials also hope to take advantage of increased
access to newly released IRS electronic data regarding tax-exempt
nonprofits, as detailed below. 82
C.

Nonprofits and the Public

There is an important aspect of the information collected by
government regulators regarding nonprofits: theoretically, information
relating to nonprofits is also available to nonprofits generally and the
public. Furthermore, in practice this information is increasingly available
in an easily accessible manner thanks to the efforts of various private
actors. This access enables not only potential donors, members,
customers, volunteers, and employees to learn more about the particular
nonprofits of interest to them, and nonprofits to learn more about other
nonprofits, but also permits academic researchers and journalists to
access and analyze information about these organizations. In this
respect, this information is similar to the data collected by some other
federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Federal Election Commission, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in that they are available to the stakeholders, the public,
and researchers. 83
The rationale for public disclosure of information related to taxexempt nonprofit organizations is that it enables the public to ensure that

79. See MRFP, INC., supra note 11.
80. See GUIDESTAR, Press Release, supra note I I.
81. See MFRP ET AL., SINGLEPORTAL.ORG: STATE CHARITY REGISTRATION PORTAL,
https://www.nasconet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SinglePortal_OneSheets-Organizer_v I. pdf
[https://perma.cc/QKN9-QT2U].
82. Cindy M. Lott, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the TE/GE Joint Councils (Feb. 22, 2018),
in EOTAXJ. 2018-96 (2018).
83. See METHODS, MODELS, TOOLS, AND DATABASES, ENvlRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epagov/research/methods-models-tools-and-databases
[https://perma.cc/QHP2-4HG1];
DISCLOSURE DATA CATALOG, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMlSS!ON, https://classic.fec.gov/data/DataCatalog.do
[https://perma.cc/V695-l.52G]; EDGAR, SEARCH TOOLS, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE CoMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm [https://perrna.cc/9FV4-FWVW]; Rachael E. Salcido,
Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda, 91 CHI.-KENT L REv. 115, 128 (2016) (discussing data made
available by the EPA).
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these nonprofits deserve the significant tax benefits that they enjoy. 84 A
related rationale is that by claiming benefits, nonprofits voluntarily
surrender any right to privacy they may have pertaining to information
they must then provide to the IRS. 85 Similar considerations presumably
are the basis for required public disclosure at the state level relating to
charitable nonprofits. 86 While concerns over privacy and potential
misuse of disclosed information argue against disclosure, in the context
of nonprofits, commentators have found them easily outweighed by
these rationales, except possibly when they involve information relating
to particular individuals. 87
More specifically, federal law requires both the IRS and tax-exempt
nonprofits to allow any member of the public to access applications for
recognition of exemption and recent annual information returns. 88
Requesting information on an organization-by-organization basis may be
sufficient for an individual donor interested in a limited number of
nonprofits or a journalist working on a story relating to a specific group.
However, an organization-by-organization approach would not be very
practical for a researcher attempting to develop a broader database of
information about such entities. On its website, the IRS provides a
search tool to confirm the tax-exempt and charitable, if applicable, status
of a given nonprofit and makes certain collected information available
for downloading but with limited ease ofuse. 89
Several private organizations have successfully worked with-and in
one case filed a lawsuit against-the IRS to gain broader access to this
information and, to the extent possible, in machine-readable format. 90
84. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PREsENr-lAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCWSURE
PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF TI-IE INIERNAL REvENuE SERVICE REsrRUCTIJRING AND REroRM
ACT OF 1998, VOLUME II: SlUDY OF DISCl.OSURE PROVISIONS RELATING 10 TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 5----6,
63 (2000~ https://wwwjct.gov/publications.html?fimc=startdown&id=2559 [https://penna.cc'JN2P-RJQ7].
However, it remains tlllclear whetlJ.er public disclosure actually increases legal compliance by nooprofits. See Lloyd
H. Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RFs. L REV. 801, 822 n.97 (2012).
85. Mayer, supra note 84, at 821.
86. See Hugh R. Jones, The Importance of Transparency in the Governmental Regulation of the
Nonprofit Sector: Room for Improvement?, COLUMBIA I ACAD. COMMONS 2-3, 10-11 (2013),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10. 7916/D86H4 FG7 [https://perma.cc/L8ZM-FULK].
87. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 62---64; Mayer, supra note 84, at 821-23, 828---29.
88. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6104(a)-1,(d)-l (2018).
89. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - CHARITIES & OTHER TAX-EXEMPT
ORG ANIZATIONS ST ATISTICS, https://www.irs.gov/ statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-taxexempt-organizati ons-stati sti cs [https://perma.cc/8XKM-XPZX]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX
EXEMPT
ORGANIZATION
SEARCH,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/tax-exemptorganization-search [https://perma.cc/40D5-ZRSY].
90. Machine-readable simply means that that the data is in a format that can be automatically read
and processed by a computer. See OPEN DATA HANDBOOK, GLOSSARY: MACHINE READABLE,
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These efforts are part of the larger "open data" movement, which strives
to get governments to release information proactively in order to
facilitate accountability, transparency, and private-public collaboration. 91
The first group providing broader access was the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), originally housed in the national nonprofit
umbrella organization Independent Sector in the 1980s, but then
transferred in the mid-l 990s to its current home at the Urban Institute,
itself a charitable nonprofit. 92 NCCS has developed and made publicly
available a number of nonprofit databases, based in large part of
information obtained from the IRS. NCCS manages collections made
available by the IRS: the IRS Exempt Organization Business Master
Files contains basic information for all active and filing tax-exempt
nonprofits for 1989 and 1995-2016, and the IRS Statistics of Income
Sample Data Files contains information from a sample of Forms 990 and
990-EZ for 1982-1983 and 1985-2012. 93 Additionally, NCCS has
developed databases containing selected information from all Forms
990, 990-EZ, and 990-PF for 1989-2015.94 Working with the IRS,
NCCS also developed a categorization system for nonprofits known as
the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE). 95 NCCS designed
its databases primarily by use for researchers, although it is in the
process of developing a new data platform that will provide easier access
for non-experts. 96
The second group to come on the scene, but likely the most wellknown, is GuideStar, founded in the mid-l 990s and itself a charitable

http://opendatahandbook.org/glossary/en/terms/machine-readable/ [https://perma.cc/9FKZ-B7MH].
For information about the lawsuit, see infra note 107 and accompanying text.
91. See generally Beth S. Noveck, Rights-Based and Tech-Driven: Open Data, Freedom of
Information, and the Future of Government Transparency, 19 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. I
(2017) ( describing the open data movement).
92. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., lHE CHARITABLE NONPROFITS: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL
AND CHARACTERISTICS 32 n.2 (1994); About Us, INDEPENDENTSECTORORG,
httpsJ/independentsector.org/about-us/ [httpsJ/pennacc/4B36-TUZG ] (descnbing Independent Sector as
"the only national membership organization that brings together the charitable community . . . to advance the
common good"); Featured Projects, NCCS DATA ARCHJVE, httpsJ/nccs.utban.org/ [httpsJ/permacc/KQW9EUW2] (identifying NCCS as now part of the Urban Institute).
DYNAMICS

93. National Center for Charitable Statistics Data Archive, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE, https://nccsdata.urban.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/9RA5-3wx4].
94. Id.
95. National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Codes, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE,
http://nccs.urban.org/classification/national-taxonomy-exempt-entities [https://perma.cc/P3HC-59DB].
96. Nonprofit Data at Your Fingertips, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE,
[https://perma.cc/C5XK-7RNS].

http://nccs.urban.org/
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nonprofit. 97 Unlike NCCS, its target audience is the public generally,
including nonprofit leaders, donors, and journalists; like NCCS it also
relies primarily on information obtained from the IRS, although it also
gathers additional information from the nonprofits themselves and other
sources. 98 GuideStar has developed a reputation as a source for
information about nonprofits because of the breadth of its coverage and
its user friendly website. 99 GuideStar also receives approximately 350
variables from Form 990 financial data from the NCCS. 100 It only
recently announced that it will merge with the Foundation Center, which
collects information on grants, to further enhance its database. 101 In
order to finance its operations, however, it requires payment for some
search and analysis tools, downloading options, data services, reports,
and older information. 102
The most recent entry into this space is ProPublica, a charitable
nonprofit that focuses on investigative journalism. 103 It launched its
Nonprofit Explorer website earlier this decade and has continually
updated it since that time. 104 The website provides a search engine to
access IRS information, including Form 990s, for any given tax-exempt
nonprofit beginnirlg with 2013, along with certain federal grant audit

97. GuideStar: A Brief History,
[https://perma.cc/W86V-92YQ].

GUIDESTAR,

https://learn.guidestar.org/about-us/history

98. See
Hi!
We 're
GuideStar,
GUIDESTAR,
https://leam.guidestar.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/5HCP-G8ER] (data sources described under "What We Do").
99. See GuideStar: A Brief History, GUIDESTAR, supra note 97 (noting that Forms 990 and 990EZ were first posted in 1999; Form 990-PF in 2000; and the database was expanded to include all
tax-exempt organizations in 2005).
100. Getting
Started
with
NCCS
Data,
NCCS
DATA
ARCHIVE,
http://nccs.urban.org/database/overview-nccs-data-files [https://perma.cc/5AE8-MW9Y] (describing
NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database); GUIDE TO USING NCCS DATA, NAT'L
CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS 3, https://nccs-data.urban.org/NCCS-data-guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XKP7-VQZS].
101. See Marc Gunther, 2 Information Giants, Foundation Center and GuideStar, to Join Forces,
THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 5, 2019), https://philanthropy.com/article/2-InformationGiants/245608 [https://perma.cc/N7Z5-EKZS]; Press Release, Foundation Ctr., Foundation Center
and GuideStar Join Forces to Become a New Nonprofit Entity Named Candid (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://foundationcenter.org/about-us/press-room/archive/foundation-center-and-guidestar-joinforces-to-become-a-new-nonprofit-entity-named-candid [https://perma.cc/ED32-68XU].
102. See GuideStar Products & Services, GUIDESTAR, https://leam.guidestar.org/products/
[https://perma.cc/ W86V-92YQ].
103. See The Mission, About
[https://perma.cc/QSF7-XYGK].

Us,

PROPuBLICA,

https://www.propublica.org/about/

104. See Mike Tigas, Announcing the Nonprofit Explorer AP/, PROPuBLICA (Sept. 26, 2013,
10:20
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/nerds/announcing-the-nonprofit-explorer-api
[https://perma.cc/X9DR-WM27].

2019]

USING BIG DATA TO REGULATE NONPROFITS

1301

information since 2016. 105 It also provides an application-programming
interface that allows more robust searches. 106
This machine-readable data became public in 2017 when an open data
promoting organization challenged the IRS. 107 While the organization
only sought access to machine-readable data from the annual
information returns filed by certain tax-exempt nonprofits, in the wake
of a federal trial court ruling against it, the IRS decided to publicly
release the machine-readable data for all e-filed annual information
returns from 2011 forward as an Amazon Web Services public
dataset. 108 Congress also recently codified a requirement that the IRS
release these data in machine-readable form. 109 Finally, there have been
some efforts to create more specialized databases of nonprofit
information. For example, a Vermont nonprofit launched a database
focused on nonprofits from that state. 110
As the introduction to this Part indicates, the mere release of data
does not mean that those data are immediately usable by researchers and
others. It is taking a concerted effort by a number of academics and
private organizations working together as the Nonprofit Open Data
Collective to clean up those data in order to make them usable. 111 For

105. See
Nonprofit
Explorer,
PROPuBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/
[https://perma.cc/X3D3-J42S] (referencing the "About This Data" section).
106. Id.
107. See Public Resource.org v. IRS, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Alec
Glassford, Nonprofit Explorer Update: Full Text of 1.9 Million Records, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 10,
2017, 11 :38 AM), https://www.propublica.org/nerds/nonprofit-explorer-update-full-text-of-nearlytwo-million-records [https://perma.cc/53GG-X3RJ].
108. See id.; IRS 990 Filing Data Now Available as an AWS Public Data Set, AMAzON WEB
SERVICES:
AWS
Gov'T,
Eouc.,
&
NONPROFITS
BLOG
(June
15,
2016),
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/irs-990-filing-data-now-available-as-an-aws-publicdata-set/ [https://perma.cc/WS9G-KKPJ]; Suzanne Perry, JRS Plans to Begin Releasing Electronic
Nonprofit Tax Forms Next Year, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (June 30, 2015),
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/IRS-Plans-to-Begin-Releasing/231265
[https://perma.cc/UU6S-EZFM].
109. See Taxpayer First Act of 2019, H.R. 1957, I 16th Cong.§ 3101(c) (2019).
110. See Andrea Suozzo, Explore the Organizations and People that Power Vermont's $6.8
Bi/lion
Nonprofit
Economy,
SEVEN
DAYS:
VERMONT
NONPROFIT
NAVIGATOR,
https://nonprofits.sevendaysvt.com [https://perma.cc/U3UF-3WZG]; Matthew Roy, Seven Days
Launches Vermont Nonprofit Navigator Database, SEVEN DAYS: OFF MESSAGE (June 28, 2018,
4 :00 AM), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OflMessage/archives/2018/06/28/seven-days-launchesvermont-nonprofit-navigator-database [https://perma.cc/JKB5-F79W].
111. See How the Nonprofit Open Data Collective Came Together to Work on IRS 990 Data in
the Cloud, AMAZON WEB SERVICES: AWS Gov'T, EDUC., & NONPROFITS BLOG (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/how-the-nonprofit-open-data-collective-came-togetherto-work-on-irs-990-data-in-the-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/3PEX-69HZ]; Stephanie Roman, The Aspen
Institute 's Program on Philanthropy and Social innovation (PSI) Hosts Nonprofit Datathon, ASPEN
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example, the dataset reflected dozens of different electronic formats for
the Form 990 over the time period at issue, which had to be reconciled
sufficiently to allow for meaningful analysis of those data in the
aggregate. 112 The cleaned up data are now available on GitHub, an
online platform recently purchased by Microsoft. 113 These data represent
a major increase in the computerized data available from the Form 990,
since it includes thousands of fields as compared to the hundreds of
fields previously digitized by the NCCS. 114 Cleaning work is continuing
on the initially released data, and will have to continue indefinitely as
the IRS continues to release data from newly filed annual information
returns. But these data only reflect e-filed returns, and so currently
provide only a partial picture of Form 990, Form 990-EZ, and Form 990PF filers. 115
Nonprofits and the public also have access to the state databases for
charitable nonprofits in some states, although the extent of access
varies. 116 It appears that public access comes with, at most, simple
search capabilities that, while perhaps sufficient to locate information
regarding a particular charitable nonprofit, do not facilitate consideration
of the data in the aggregate. 117 Finally, a variety of private organizations,
including watchdog groups such as Charity Navigator and the Better
Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance and umbrella organizations
such as the Foundation Center, have complied their own databases and
analyses of selected nonprofits drawing from a range of available

INSTITUTE (June 6, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/aspen-institutes-programphilanthropy-social-innovation-psi-hosts-nonprofit-datathon/ [https://perma.cc/K986-NYT9].
112. Roman, supra note 111.
113. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54; Microsoft completes GitHub
acquisition,
OFFICIAL
MICROSOFT
BLOG
(Oct.
26,
2018),
https :/lb logs.mi crosoft. com/b log/2018/1 0/26/microsoft-comp letes-gi thub-acquisition/
[https://perma.cc/ECP5-65Z7].
114. See supra notes 93, 100 and accompanying text.
115. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54 (referencing the "IRS 990 E-Filer Data"
section).
116. Lorr ET AL., supra note 70, at 25.
117. See, e.g., Registry Verification Search, STATE OF CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: OFF. OF THE ATT'Y GEN.,
http)/rctdoj .ca.govNerification/Web/Search.aspx?fucility=Y [httpsJ/perma.cc/C9W7-PKBN] (stating the
search tool is designed to obtain information with respect to a particular charitable organization or fimdraiser);
Charitable Trust Database Search, ILL. Arr'Y GEN., httpJ/charitableviewer.ilattomeygeneral.net/
[httpsJ/perma.cc/QY4K-8V6U] (stating that the database provides financial information about individual
charities); Welcome to the Chan'ties Bureau Registry Search, CHARITIEsNYS.COM, NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., httpsJ/www.charitiesnys.com/RegistrySearch/search_charities.jsp
[httpsJ/perma.cc/527N-6CAK] (stating the search tool is designed to search for a specific organization).
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sources, but these databases tend to be relatively limited in scope,
accessibility, and searchability. 118
These government-related efforts do not reflect the only potential use
of Big Data approaches by nonprofits, of course. For example, the
consulting firm M+R offers a variety of Big Data-related services to
nonprofits, promoted in part through its annual Benchmarks Study. 119 Its
most recent Benchmarks Study focused on over five billion digital
interactions with supporters of 154 participating nonprofitsY 0 However,
these purely private efforts do not relate directly to government use of
Big Data to regulate nonprofits. They also do not make information
available to the public, except either in aggregate form or with the
consent of the particular nonprofit involved. They are therefore not the
focus of this Article.
D.

Other Countries

Before considering how trends in the collection and analysis of data
regarding nonprofits in the United States may benefit or hurt the
oversight of the nonprofit sector here, it is worth noting that in most
other countries government regulators are also moving in a similar
direction. The Canada Revenue Agency is expected to begin using Big
Data methods to analyze its nonprofit database in the near future. 121
Since 2013, the agency has made all of its datasets dating from 2000
forward available through the government's data portal. 122 The Charity
Commission for England and Wales similarly provides the public with
I 18. See, e.g., Which Charity Report Are You Looking For?, BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE,
https://www.give.org/ [https://perma.cc/4M5V-PHJ3] (allowing searches by charity name);
Advanced
Search,
CHARITY
NAVIGATOR,
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfi:n?bay=search.advanced [https://perma.cc/PQ7V-GMHY]
(allowing searches by a limited set of criteria); 990 Finder, FOUNDATION CENTER,
https://foundationcenter.org/find-funding/990-finder [https://perma.cc/NDR6-G7KB] (same).
119. See Services, M+R, https://www.mrss.com/work/ [https://perma.cc/WDV4-UAFS]; M+R,
The 2019 Benchmarks will be mind-boggling. Join us for the journey!, M+R BLOG (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.mrss.com/lab/the-2019-benchmarks-will-be-mind-boggling-join-us-for-the-joumey/
[https://perma.cc/YZR2-UWGU].
120. M+R,
BENCHMARKS
2018,
https://namp .ameri cansforthearts. org/ sites/default/files/2018_Benchmarks_S tudy. pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6E7-Y8DX].
121. See C. Yvonne Chenier, CRA and the Champ, DRAKE APTOWITZER LLP, (Sept. 14, 2017),
http://drache.ca/articles/cra-and-the-champ/ [https://perma.cc/844A-69WY].
122. JULIET MCMURREN ET AL., OPEN DATA'S IMPACT: OPENING CANADA'S T3010 CHARITY
INFORMATION RETURN DATA: ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITIES THROUGH OPEN DATA 3 (2016),
http://odimpact.org/case-opening-canadas-t30 I 0-charity-information-retum-data.html
[https://perma.cc/KZG3-SRE3].
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the ability to electronically extract the data from its registry of charities
for all registered charities. 123 The Australian Charities and Not-forProfits Commission recently made available the information submitted
by charities in that country on their 2015 Annual Information
Statements. 124 The New Zealand Charities Services agency provides a
robust search engine and the ability to download data in mass on its
website. 125 The charity regulators in Ireland and Scotland also allow
public, online access to their charity registers. 126 It appears that access is
limited to only the most basic facts regarding registered charities, as
opposed to the entirety of the information filed by those charities. 127 But
in Ireland, a private partner has stepped up to create a more robust,
publicly available database of information for nonprofit organizations in
that country, similar to what has happened in the United States. 128 This
incomplete list only provides a sample of the data available outside the
United States, as there are other private and government databases. 129
These developments indicate that while the United States may be at or
close to the leading edge of the Big Data approach to information
regarding nonprofits, it is far from alone in moving in this direction. This
is particularly true because, as will be seen, most aspects of both the
promises and perils are not country-dependent but apply universally. The
one maJor exception is legal limits, which of course are countrydependent.

123. See Registered Charities in England and Wales: Data/or Registered and Removed Charities
England and Wales, CHARITY COMMISSION, http://data.charitycommission.gov.uk/datadefinition.aspx [https://perma.cc/NQG4-U2FF].

in

124. See New Charity Data Available on Data.gov.au, AUSTRALIAN CHARITIES AND NOT-FORPROFITS COMMISSION: NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.acnc.gov.au/media/news/new-charitydata-available-datagovau [https://perma.cc/8E48-V8A2].
125. See The Charities Register, CHARITIES SERVICES, https://www.charities.govt.nz/charities-innew-zealand/the-charities-register/ [https://perma.ccff7QZ-UDFF].
126. See
Information
for
the
Public,
CHARITIES
REGULATOR,
httpJ/www.charitiesreguJatoryauthority.ie/en/CRA/Pages/WPl 6000072
[httpsJ/perma.cc/S4B5-S88Z];
Charity Register Download, ScoTTISH CHARITY REGULATOR, httpsJ/www.oscr.org.uk/aboutcharities/search-the-register/charity-register-<lownload [httpsJ/perma.cc/S85U--64T6].
127. See supra note 26.
128. See
What is Benefacts?, BENEFACTS,
httpsJ/en.benefucts.ie/about/what-is-benefucts/
[httpsJ/permacc/QBM2-K57F]; Patricia Quinn, Bene/acts: Building a Data Infrastructure to Support Public
Policyfor Nonprofits in Ireland (2018) (unpublished manuscript) ( on file with author).
129. See, e.g., 1i-IE CHARITY VAULT, httpsJ/web.archive.orglweb/20180224033949/httpJ/charitycharities.orgl [httpsJ/perma.cc/GKS7-N6XN] (referencing a private directory of more than 100,000 organizations
around the world); lsRAEL GivEs, httpsJ/www.israelgives.org/pages/mdex [httpsJ/perrna.cc/QW7B-YSBG]
(referencing a private database of"all of Israel's 42,000 non-profits and charities'').
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THE PROMISES OF USING BIG DATA TO REGULATE
NONPROFITS

The promises of Big Data are based on the technology-driven growth
in the amount of data collected electronically, particularly through the
Internet, and the technology-enabled development of advanced analytics
to analyze those data in order "to uncover patterns, correlations,
anomalies, outliers, and other insights not suggested by a priori
hypotheses or explicit assumptions" that can then be used to improve
actions or decisions. 130 In the context of government regulation, the
potential exists both to more efficiently enforce existing laws and to
better design rules to achieve desired outcomes. 131 For example, in 2011,
New York City launched a new data-based system for determining what
buildings to inspect for "illegal conversions"--dividing up a property so
it can house many more people that it was designed to do so safely-and
overnight inspector visits found unsafe conditions meriting orders to
vacate in over 70% of cases as opposed to the previous rate of 13%. 132 In
addition, to the extent government collected data are made available to
the public, that availability could increase government accountability
and transparency, spur private research that aids government goals, and
provide improved information to the public. 133 This Part addresses
whether and to what extent these benefits might be found in the context
of government regulation of nonprofits.
A.

Improved Government Oversight

The regulatory goal of the IRS and state agencies is to ensure
compliance with the applicable laws in a fair manner. With respect to
regulating nonprofits, this goal is easy to state, but difficult to
implement. 134 This task is complicated by the very limited resources that
130. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-16-659SP, DATA
INNOVATION: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 11 (2016).

AND ANALYTICS

131. See KITCHIN, supra note 17, at 115-16; MANYIKAET AL., supra note 5, at 61-62.
132. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHl'.)NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 186--88 (2013 ).
133. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

I 34. See Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance, INTERNAL REvENuE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/govemment-entities/tax-exempt-govemment-entities-division-at-a-glance
[https://permacc/4N3Y-2KPQ] ("Our mission is to provide our customers top quality service by helping you
understand and comply with applicable tax laws and to protect the public interest by applying the tax law with
integrity and fairness to all."); NATIONAL Assoc. OF ST. CHARITY OFFICIALS, https://www.nasconet.org/
[https://permacc/XH8W-NDEL] (an association of "state offices ... charged with oversight of charitable
organizations and charitable solicitation in the United States'').
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both the IRS and state regulators have available for regulating nonprofits
in the United States compared to the number, financial size, and variety
of these nonprofits. 135 These limited resources have, in turn, led to a
federal audit rate of less than half-a-percent for the annual information
returns filed by tax-exempt nonprofits. 136 No data is available regarding
the overall level of enforcement activities by state regulators, but
anecdotal evidence indicates a similarly low level of enforcement
activity. 137
In its most recent Work Plans, TE/GE has emphasized improving
transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness, with the increased reliance
on data-driven methods particularly related to the latter two goals. 138 For
example, in 2016 TE/GE noted that testing case selection modeling
techniques resulted in a change rate of 85% for closed audits, which
appears to mean that in 85% of cases, the IRS successfully asserted that
the filing organization had to change its activities or reporting. 139 More
recent information released by the IRS indicated a change rate of slightly
over 80%, which exceeds the IRS' s usual target. 140 Increased change
rates for audits would indicate improvements to efficiency-the greater
the proportion of audits that result in changes, the more efficient the
audit selection process is, as agents are not wasting their time and the
audited organization's time by checking organizations that are in full
compliance with the law. Increased change rates would also indicate
improvements to effectiveness, because a higher change rate indicates
that fewer legal violations are going undetected and uncorrected.

135. See LOTT ET AL., supra note 70, at 8; Mayer, supra note 66, at 83.
136. Mayer, supra note 66, at 91.
137. See SHIRLEY ADELSTEIN & ELIZABETH T. BORIS, STATE REGULATION OF THE CHARITABLE
SECTOR:
ENFORCEMENT,
OUTREACH,
STRUCTURE,
AND
STAFFING
2
(2018),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/state-regulation-charitable-sector
[https://perma.cc/2A2G-KYPF]; Mayer, supra note 67, at 940.
138. TE/GE, 2018, supra note 42, at 6-8; TAX EXEMPT AND GoVERNMENT ENTITIES (TE/GE),
FY 2017 WORK PLAN 3-8 (2016) [hereinafter TE/GE, 2017], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/tege_fy2017_ work_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM5D-WRD2]. This parallels similar efforts in
the broader IRS, driven in significant part by the need to maximize the use of limited resources. See
Bulusu, supra note 28; Sony Kassam, IRS Catches $10 Billion in Tax Fraud in 2018, DAILY TAX
REP., BLOOMBERG TAX (Nov. 14, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.corn/daily-taxreport/irs-catches-1O-billion-in-tax-fraud-in-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/J4FF-RC8C] (crediting data
analytics for a four-fold increase in the amount of tax fraud discovered).
139. See TE/GE, 2017, supra note 138, at 6-7. A greater amount of data and a greater ability to
use those data could also benefit efforts to design new rules for nonprofits. See Ruth Madrigal,
Attorney-Advisor, Department of the Treasury, Remarks at the Urban Institute (Dec. 1, 2015), in
EO TAX J. 2016-6 (Jan. 11, 2016).
140. Von Lienen, supra note 44, at 7.
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While touted primarily as a means of reducing the compliance burden
on charitable nonprofits, the states' Single Portal initiative also holds the
promise of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of state oversight
by creating an electronic database of information that state regulators
can use. 141 The states anticipate that the database will "maximize
efficiency, data transparency, and information sharing," including by
helping regulators connect Form 990 data and state registration data and
by enabling them to use analytics "to better understand charitable
resources and solicitations, to better focus law enforcement and fraud
prevention resources, and [to] enable better policy making for protection
of charitable resources." 142 In other words, improved efficiency and
effectiveness. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the promise of
better government oversight is actually fulfilled by these technological
developments. As for improved accountability and transparency, the
regulators in this area are hindered by the need to not unduly tip their
hand to potential bad actors. 143 That said, the data they have made
available to outside researchers may also lead to improvements in this
area.
B.

Improved Research

Another often cited benefit of these Big Data moves relating to
nonprofit organizations is greater access to information by academic
researchers, who presumably in turn will conduct analyses that then aid
policy makers and the public. 144 The Single Portal initiative is touted in
part because "[a]cademics, policy makers and the public will be able to
conduct their own inquiries or download data in machine-readable
format." 145 The IRS has not specifically promoted this research benefit
for the data it makes available, but the effect of its decision to release in
machine-readable format all recent e-filed Forms 990, when combined
with the efforts of private actors to clean those data to make them usable
by researchers, has now made these data accessible for private
research. 146
141. See GUIDEST AR, Press Release, supra note 11.
142. MRFP, INC., supra note 11.
143. See Tai Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1512 (2013) ("The
IRS maintains full secrecy as to the selective auditing schemes it applies").
144. See BETH s. NOVECK & DANJEL L. GoROFF, INFORMATION FOR IMPACT: LIBERATING NONPROm
SECTOR DATA (2013), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/psi/psi_Informationfor-Impact.pdf[https://permacdX7X7-6QUX].
145. MRFP, INC., supra note 11.

146. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
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Recent work by Professors Brian Galle and Terri Helge hints at the
potential of greater access to data about nonprofits. In two articles, Galle
drew upon the private foundation data compiled by NCSS and other
information to provide new analyses of (1) private foundation
investment returns and their relationship to the rate of distributions to
support current charitable activities, and (2) how differences in state law
standing rules correlated with private foundation administrative cost
ratios. 147 His research has important ramifications for the law relating to
restricted gifts, particularly for the appropriate legally required
distribution rate (the "payout" rate) for private foundations, and also for
developments with respect to state standing law. Helge comprehensively
reviewed all of the letters from IRS denying applicants for recognition of
exemption as charities from 2004 through early 2017 to determine the
grounds for denials and their relative frequency. 148 Her research is
relevant to whether recent changes in the application process may result
in a significant number of unqualified organizations nevertheless being
recognized by the IRS as tax-exempt charities, and also may help
identify the common pitfalls for such organizations when they are first
starting out. While less directly applicable to legal compliance,
researchers in other fields have also begun to take advantage of the
increasing amount of available nonprofit data. For example, Professors
Nathan Grasse and Jesse Lecy and their co-authors have used nonprofit
data to explore a variety of topics, including government grants to
nonprofits and issues relating to nonprofit compensation. 149 Researchers
in other countries are also exploring possible uses of nonprofit data
newly available in their home countries. 150
14 7. See Brian Galle, Valuing the Right to Sue: An Empirical Examination of Nonprofit Agency
Costs, 60 J.L. & ECON. 413 (2017); Brian Galle, Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of
Restricted-Spending Philanthropy, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1143-44 (2016).
148. Terri L. Helge, Rejecting Charity: Why the IRS Denies Tax Exemption to 50l(c)(3)
Applicants, 14 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2016).
149. See, e.g., Nathan Grasse et al., Understanding the Compensation of Nonprofit Executive
Directors: Examining the Influence of Perfonnance and Organizational Characteristics, 24
NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 377, 378 (2014) (using Form 990 data from the NCCS); Jesse
Lecy & Jeremy Thornton, What Big Data Can Tell Us About Government Awards to the Nonprofit
Sector: Using the FAADS, 45 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1052, 1060-62 (2016) (same).
150. See, e.g., Natasha Cortis, Linking Non-Profit Data Across Government: An Australian
Example 2 (July 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (proposing linking data from
the Australian Charities Non-for-profits Commission dataset to the Workplace Gender Equality
Agency dataset to explore gender equality issues in the charity workforce of Australia); Megan
LePere-Schloop et al., NGO Classification From the Bottom-Up: Using Self-Reported Data and
Machine Leaming to Generate Categories of NGOs in Ghana 4 (July 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (using digitized data from the annual reports of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) operating in Gahan to develop a database of these NGOs).
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Of course, the potential for new research resulting from the greater
public access to these government-collected datasets will depend on the
level of funding available and the related interest of academics in
pursuing this research. But the studies noted above and the existence and
support for the efforts of NCSS, GuideStar, ProPublica, and the
Nonprofit Open Data Collaborative indicate that both of these critical
factors exist to some extent. Indeed, two major foundations, the Charles
Stewart Mott Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
helped support the latter effort. 151
C.

Improved Information for the Public

The government-collected datasets also hold the promise of greater
information reaching the public in the form of academic research, direct
public access, and public dissemination through intermediaries. In terms
of direct access at the federal level, the IRS has recently revamped its
now-renamed "Tax Exempt Organization Search" function to ease
public access to its database for tax-exempt nonprofits and to expand the
amount of information available to the public through it, although it has
acknowledged some glitches in its implementation. 152 At the state level,
the Single Portal initiative will include a search feature to allow public
access to the data collected. 153
Intermediaries who will likely benefit from the increase public access
to information include journalists and watchdog organizations. A Wall
Street Journal reporter recently tapped into the newly available e-filed
annual information returns data to identify all of the charity employees
receiving seven-figure annual compensation amounts. 154 Watchdog
organizations such as Charity Navigator, MinistryWatch, and Wise
Giving Alliance presumably could also benefit from increased access to
information about the charities that they evaluate or otherwise provide
151. See
Nonprofit
Data
Project
Updates,
ASPEN
INST.,
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/program-on-philanthropy-and-social-innovationpsi/nonprofit-data-project-updates/ [https://perma.cc/UDH9-98QR] (identifying these two
foundations as the funders for the project).
152. Press Release, Internal Rev. Serv., New IRS Online Tool Offers Expanded Access to
Information on Tax-Exempt Organizations; Newly-Filed Data Available to Public for First Time
(May 7, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/new-irs-online-tool-offers-expanded-access-toinformation-on-tax-exempt-organizations-newly-filed-data-available-to-public-for-first-time
[https://perma.cc/Z7EP-2RAY]; Von Lienen, supra note 44 ("We had a couple oflittle glitches with
[the Tax-Exempt Organization Search] that have popped up.").
153. MRFP, INC., supra note 11.
154. Andrea Fuller, Million Dollar Paydays Jump for Officials at Charities,
Mar. 6, 2017, at Al.
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information regarding. 155 For example, while Charity Navigator only
rates approximately 10,000 charities, it provides basic information for all
charities registered with the IRS; the amount of such basic information
available could dramatically increase if Charity Navigator takes
advantage of access toe-filed annual information returns. 156
III.

THE PERILS OF USING BIG DATA TO REGULATE
NONPROFITS

The promises of applying Big Data methods to nonprofits, both
through direct effects on government oversight and indirect effects on
academic research and information available to the public, are therefore
significant but as yet mostly unrealized. There are, however, a number of
significant perils associated with such methods that commentators have
identified generally and all of which apply at least to some extent in the
context of nonprofits. Some of these concerns arise with respect to
greater access to data of all types, while some are particular to the Big
Data context. These perils include faulty results stemming from data
inaccuracies, analysis inaccuracies, or over-reliance on analysis results.
They also include larger concerns, such as invasion of privacy, improper
discrimination, increased government power, and violations of
constitutional or statutory protections more generally. 157
A.

Getting It Wrong

One of the greatest concerns raised by commentators regarding Big
Data is the tendency of some Big Data supporters to oversell what it can
accomplish. Chris Anderson, then the Editor-in-Chief of Wired
155. See More About Us, BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, https://www.give.org/about-bbbwga/more-about-us/
[https://perma.cc/LT85-5JQY];
About Us,
CHARITY NAVIGATOR,
https://www .charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content. view&cpid= 1653 [https://perma.cc/739DXHLR]; About MinistryWatch, MINISTRYWATCH, https://www.ministrywatch.com/about.php
[https://perma.cc/7S2J-TWYV].
156. See CHARITY NAVIGATOR,About Us, supra note 155.
157. See generally DAVID BOLLIER, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF BIG DATA (2010),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/The_Promise_and_Peril_of
_Big_Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3DV-V4VK] (summary of benefits and concerns arising from
Big Data expressed by participants in an Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology);
FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?: UNDERSTANDING THE
ISSUES 8-11 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-orexclusion-understanding-issues/ 160 I 06big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK6M-STVR] ( discussing
concerns relating to private company use of Big Data techniques); Nathan Cortez, Regulation by
Database, 89 COLO. L. REV. I, 29-37 (2018) (discussing the potential downsides of publicly
disclosed, government-compiled databases).
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magazine, once argued that the emergence of Big Data was making the
scientific method obsolete. 158 But in reality, Big Data methods have
numerous limitations relating to the data on which they rely, the choices
regarding how to analyze those data, and the interpretations of the
results. 159 All of these limitations can be found in the nonprofit area and
so users of Big Data methods with respect to nonprofits-whether
government regulators, researchers, or nonprofits and the public more
generally-have to be conscious of them in order to avoid reaching
incorrect conclusions or incorrectly applying results.

1.

Data Inaccuracy and Limits: Garbage In, Garbage Out

At least currently, both the IRS and the major private databases rely
primarily on information contained in the annual returns filed by taxexempt nonprofits. However, the return information is not necessarily
accurate. Furthermore, the limited reliance on data from other sources
means that any inaccuracies may remain undetected absent
individualized consideration of a particular nonprofit, whether through
an IRS audit or a private party's investigation. And, as already noted,
datasets may require careful cleaning-for example, matching annual
information return fields over multiple versions of the form over timeto be rendered into a format that is amenable to accurate analysis. 160
Finally, financially smaller tax-exempt nonprofits can file shorter returns
that contain significantly less information while a large number of taxexempt nonprofits-particularly churches and certain church-related
entities-are not required to file a return. 161
While research on the accuracy of annual information returns is
limited, the research that exists indicates that inaccuracies are
widespread for at least some types of information. In 2000, Professors
Karen Froelich, Terry Knoepfle, and Thomas Pollalk compared the
annual information returns for a sample of 350 nonprofit organizations

158. Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method
Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/
[https://perma.cc/EZ4 W-J97E].
159. Boyd & Crawford, supra note 4, at 666; D. Brent Edwards Jr., Big Data? Big Deal: The
Inability of Big Data to Escape the Limitations of Impact Evaluations, NORRAG: BLOG (Mar. 12,
2019), https://www.norrag.org/big-data-big-deal-the-inability-of-big-data-to-escape-the-limitationsof-impact-evaluation-by-d-brent-edwards-jr/ [https://perma.cc/A4GS-3UJL].
160. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54; supra note 111 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 42, 46 and accompanying text.
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with their audited financial statements. 162 They found that disparities
between these two types of documents varied depending on the type of
information at issue, concluding that "[ v ]ariables outside the primary
focus of nonprofit organizations, such as net rental income and gross
profit from sales, and to a lesser extent, management expenses, should
be used with caution and interpreted carefully." 163 In 2004, Thomas
Pollak at the Urban Institute reported that he had found a substantial
portion of tax-exempt nonprofits listed significant contributions
($50,000 or more) but no fundraising costs on their returns, indicating
significant underreporting of such costs. 164 A more recent report by the
Scripps Howard News Service found that 41% of the almost 38,000 taxexempt nonprofits that reported at least $1 million in contributions also
reported no fundraising costs on their returns. 165 It is therefore likely that
fundraising costs are often underreported, particularly given that some
watchdog groups have relied heavily on the ratio of programmatic to
administration and fundraising costs as a measure of nonprofit
effectiveness and some state regulators have also emphasized this
ratio.166
Such inaccurate reporting may extend to other areas that could draw
negative public or regulator attention. In 2015, Yahoo News reported
that the National Rifle Association (NRA) had spent millions on
election-related activities over a number of years but failed to report any
such expenditures on its IRS annual return as required, an error the NRA

162. Karen A. Froelich et al., Financial Measures in Nonprofit Organization Research:
Comparing IRS 990 Return and Audited Financial Statement Data, 29 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 232, 232 (2000).
163. Id. at 251.
164. MARK A HAGER ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT OVERHEAD Cosrs IN THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 1 (2004), https://www.urban.orgisites'defuult/files/publication/57576/310930-What-WeKnow-about-Ovemead-Costs-in-the-Nonprofit-Sector.PDF [https://perrnacc/99HT-5LU5].
165. Thomas Hargrove & Waqas Naeem, MONEY FOR NOTHING: WHEN NONPROFITS MISLEAD,
SCRIPPS How ARD NEWS SERVICE 4 (20 I 2), https://www.scribd.com/document/11194 ! 936/Moneyfor-nothing-When-nonprofits-mislead [https://perma.cc/HC7P-VHRY].
166. See, e.g., Criteria & Methodology, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/aboutcharitywatch/criteria-methodology/3113/314 7 [https://perma.cc/G79V-38J9] (grading charities
based on the percent of total expenses a charity spent on its programs and the cost to the charity of
bringing in a $100 of cash donations from the public); N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN.,
PENNIES FOR CHARITY: WHERE YOUR MONEY GoES: F'uNDRAISING BY PROFESSIONAL
FvNDRAISERS
2
(2018),
https://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/pennies-for-charity-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EZ9-N3P4] (focusing on the dollar amount and percentage of total donations to a
given charity that go toward the expense of professional fundraisers).
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acknowledged in response. 167 The National Taxpayer Advocate and
others have also identified numerous errors on the recently created,
streamlined tax exemption application form (Form 1023-EZ) for smaller,
charitable nonprofits, which do not bode well for how accurate the
annual returns filed by these organizations will be. 168
One of the potential benefits of Big Data is it can identify possible
inaccuracies by networking and comparing multiple datasets, in effect
doing on a larger scale and more automatically what the researchers for
the 2000 study did with a small sample of nonprofits. 169 It is possible
that the launch of the Single Portal initiative, and with it the ability to
compare federal information returns with state filings, could take
advantage of this potential benefit of Big Data. The IRS has also stated it
will begin using unidentified external data sources to help it identify tax exempt nonprofits at risk of certain legal violations involving prohibited
financial or other benefits for insiders or others, presumably in a manner
similar to what the IRS already does for taxable individuals and
entities. 170 It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which this
networking may identify and help correct inaccuracies in those returns.
It is of course also possible that networking could inaccurately flag
entries that are actually correct. For example, Facebook recently began
labeling a broad range of ads as "political"; if the IRS were to use that
labeling as an indication of possible prohibited political campaign
intervention expenditures by charitable nonprofits that purchase
Facebook ads, it could lead to many false positives. 171
167. Alan Berlow, The NRA 's brazen shell game with donations: A Yahoo News investigation,
POLITICS (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/the-nras-brazen-shell-game-withdonations-a-116744915796.html [https://perma.cc/F95W-PH86].
168. See Nina E. Olson, A Problem of the IRS's Own Making-Automatic Revocations of 1023EZ Exempt Organizations, TAX PAYER ADvoc. SERV.: NTA BLOG (May 16, 2018)
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-automatic-revocation-of-1023EZ-exemptorganizations [https://perma.cc/GQ6J-F89H] (summarizing concerns relating to the Form 1023-EZ,
including the relatively high rate of automatic revocation for failure to file required annual returns).
YAHOO

I 69. See Froelich et al., supra note I 62 and accompanying text.
170. See Marcus Owens, Materials for "The Current Climate for Nonprofit Enforcement," in EO
TAX J. 2017-94 (May 12, 2017); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing how data
regarding federal grants could be used to check whether tax-exempt nonprofits receiving such grants
are accurately reporting them); JENNIFER TEEFY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44027, TRACKING
FEDERAL Aw ARDS: USASPENDING.GOV AND OTHER DATA SOURCES (2019).
171. Compare Requiring Authorization and Labeling for Ads with Political Content, FACEBOOK
BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/news/requiring-authorization-and-labeling-for-adswith-political-content [https://perma.cc/S79X-94LG] (identifying as "political" ads relating to "any
national legislative issue of public importance"), with The Restriction of Political Campaign
Intervention by Section 501 (c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charitiesnon-profits/charitable-organizations/the-restriction-of-political-campaign-intervention-by-section-
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As for cleaning data, the efforts to render the recently released e-filed
information returns data illustrate the challenges in this area. 172 The
Aspen Institute's Program on Philanthropy and Social Innovation has
now hosted two multiple-day events, involving dozens of experts, to
resolve issues with these data, including reconciling the various versions
of the returns reflected in the dataset, developing a unified set of
standards, and checking numerous variables. 173 Yet their work is far
from complete with respect to the initially available dataset, much less
subsequent data releases. And, of course, until electronic filing becomes
mandatory for all tax-exempt nonprofits, this dataset lacks information
from the significant proportion of such organizations that do not file
electronically.
While it may be acceptable to have less information on financially
smaller organizations since the likely impact of any legal violations by
such groups is proportionately less as compared to financially larger
organizations there are a large number of tax-exempt nonprofits that are
not required to file annual information returns or state registration forms
and annual reports. Most notably, this exempt group includes all
churches and certain church-related entities, regardless of their financial
size or scope of activities, unless they have unrelated trade or
businesses. 174 By most estimates there are between 300,000 and 450,000
churches of all faiths in the United States, ranging from tiny
neighborhood congregations to enormous megachurches and
denominational bodies. 175 While figures are difficult to determine in this
area because of the lack of government filings, one recent study
estimated these entities had at least $100 billion in annual gross revenue
and $600 billion in real property assets. 176 By comparison, for tax year
2015, tax-exempt charities that file Form 990 annual information returns

50 I c3-tax-exempt-organizations [https://perma.cc//APL2-657T] (identifying as "political" only
communications or actions relating to candidates for elective public office).
172. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54; supra note 111 and accompanying text.
173. Cinthia S. Ottinger, Aspen Hosts 990 "Vali-Datathon" as Part ofPhilanthropy's Data Revolution,
INSTITUTE: BLOO (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/aspen-hosts-990-validatathon-part-philanthropys-data-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/59TH-8RGF].

AsPEN

174. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 INSTRUCTIONS
FOR FORM 990T EXEMPT ORGANIZATION BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURN (AND PROXY TAX
UNDER SECTION 6033(E))
2
(2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i990t-20l 7.pdf
[https://perma.ccNL66-65W9] ("Who Must File" section).
175. See Simon G. Brauer, How Many Congregations Are There? Updating a Survey-Based
Estimate, 56 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 438,439,445 (2017).
176. Ryan T. Cragun et al., Research Report: How Secular Humanists (and Everyone Else)
Subsidize Religion in the United States, FREE INQUIRY, June-July 2012, at 39, 41-42.
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reported $2.0 trillion in annual revenue and $3.8 trillion in assets, the
latter partly offset by $ 1.5 trillion in liabilities. 177 Any use by
government regulators or private parties of Big Data methods will miss
this significant part of the nonprofit universe.
Lastly, there is a lot of important information relating to nonprofits
that the IRS understandably does not ask for because it is not directly
relevant to compliance with the applicable tax laws. Perhaps the most
obvious area is information on how effective or impactful a nonprofit is
in achieving its stated mission or goals. Even for the largest nonprofits
with the broadest range of activities, all that the form requires are brief
statements relating to program service accomplishments in the
nonprofit's largest program areas. 178 While the Form 990 instructions
purport to require specific information, such as clients served, in practice
many if not most organizations provide vague, self-serving
statements. 179
2.

Analysis Inaccuracy and Limits: The Ghost in the Machine

The sophisticated computational tools that can be applied to Big Data
datasets, particularly ones that self correct as a result of machine
learning, hold out the promise of finding the proverbial needle in the
haystack in the form of previously undiscovered patterns and
relationships. At the same time, "the information revealed by big data
analysis isn't necessarily perfect. Identifying a pattern doesn't establish
whether that pattern is significant. Correlation still doesn't equal
causation .... In big data, as with all data, interpretation is always
important." 180
It is difficult to judge the methods used by TE/GE as part of its new
data-driven approach to select annual information returns for audit since
TE/GE understandably does not share the details of its algorithms in
order to avoid providing a roadmap for intentional wrongdoers to avoid

177. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, TBL. I, FORM 990 RETURNS OF 50l(c)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS: BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS, BY ASSET SIZE, TAX YEAR
2015 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15eo01.xlsx (last visited Aug. 9, 2019).
178. See IRS 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990, supra note 46, at 11-12.
179. See, e.g., President and Fellows of Harvard College, Form 990, at 2 (2017) (listing two
specific program service accomplishments described in two, relatively short paragraphs: one
"education and other institutional activities" involving "approximately 7,330 undergraduate and
14,460 graduate students," and the other "sponsored activities, including sponsored research" for
which the University "incurred $806,228,926 in expenses funded by sponsored awards").
180. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 7.
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IRS scrutiny. 181 While the initial report of a high change rate for audits
that results from this process is encouraging, without knowing how
significant the changes were that were discovered or a rigorous
comparison with the change rate resulting from other selection methods,
it is impossible to evaluate how effective the new process has been as
compared to other methods. 182 That said, the IRS is evaluating its
methods; the acting TE/GE Commissioner recently stated that when it
evaluated data-driven attempts to identify noncompliance among private
foundations, no action resulted in 48% of identified cases, indicating this
might not be a fruitful approach. 183 To address this gap further, studies
by both the IRS and other internal government offices that are allowed
access to the details of such methods are needed, along the lines of the
2015 Government Accountability Office study that highlighted the need
to strength internal controls for selection processes then employed by
TE/GE for tax-exempt nonprofits. 184
External researchers could aid in this process by publicly developing
and testing their own algorithms and other methods for analyzing the
data released by the IRS and the states, and also the data available from
other sources regarding nonprofits. In doing so, they need to be
especially conscious of the fact that in general these methods reveal
correlations but do not demonstrate causation; any correlations revealed
represent, at best, highly probable relationships but not absolute
certainty. In other words, outside researchers and the IRS need to
recognize that Big Data methods may identify when there is a greater
likelihood of illegal behavior, but they rarely if ever generate 100%
accurate results. 185 This is particularly true when Big Data methods are
used to predict future behavior of individuals or organizations, the risks
of which were made famous by the short story and movie The Minority
Report. 186 However, in the nonprofit context, no one is advocating

181. See Zarsky, supra note 143, at 1512.
182. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
183. Von Lienen, supra note 44 (reporting the 48% no change rate as an improvement over the
previous 65% no change rate).
184. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-514, IRS EXAMINATION SELECTION:
INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR EXEMPT ORGANIZATION SELECTION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 52-53
(2015); see also TIGTA, supra note 36 (evaluating RAAS project management practices).
185. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 132, at 50-72 (correlation and Big Data).
186. See Philip K.. Dick, The Minority Report, in SELECTED STORIES OF PHILIP K.. DICK 227
(2002); THE MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). This field is formally known as
"predictive analytics." See Zarsky, supra note 143, at 1505--06.
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letting the computers find a violation of even civil law, much less
criminal law, without a human-conducted, case-by-case analysis. 187
For example, say that an analysis reveals a significant correlation
between a nonprofit reporting that it lacks a conflict of interest policy
and a nonprofit later reporting an excess benefit transaction. 188 This
result would indicate that nonprofits reporting no conflict of interest
policy are at greater risk of excess benefit transactions. This result would
not indicate, however, that requiring nonprofits to adopt a conflict of
interest policy would reduce this risk, because it is unknown whether the
absence of this policy leads to the excess benefit transaction or whether
there might be a third, unmeasured factor that may cause both the lack of
such a policy and an excess benefit transaction. The lack of a conflict of
interest policy itself would not be a full proof predictor of a future
excess benefit transaction, only an indication of a higher risk for such a
transaction. Of course, being selected for an audit is not the equivalent of
being found guilty of a civil or criminal violation-that would still
require a human-conducted, individualized analysis-but such selection
is also not costless to the affected nonprofit or the government, so any
supposed correlations should be subject to rigorous testing before being
relied upon for audit selection purposes.
3.

Over-Reliance: But the Computer Told Me to Do It

Big Data methods can lead to excessive claims of accuracy and
objectivity that in tum lead to over-reliance on results. 189 Simply because
certain results are drawn from Big Data datasets using computerized
analytics does not mean they provide an accurate or complete picture of
the legal compliance of nonprofits such that other methods for
measuring compliance are now obsolete and unreliable in comparison.
As noted by David Solove, one problem with reliance on databases "is
that such records often fail to tell the entire story." 190 Inaccuracy may

187. But such reliance on computers is starting to occur in other legal contexts; for example,
Estonia is in the process of designing a "robot judge" to resolve small claims disputes. See Eric
Niiler, Can Al Be a Fair Judge in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-judge-court-estonia-thinks-so/ [https://perma.cc/S44YWHFG].
188. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2012) (defining "excess benefit" as the provision of a legally
prohibited, undue economic benefit to an insider). Taxes are imposed on persons who benefit from
an excess benefit transaction and managers who approve such a transaction. Id.
189. Boyd & Crawford, supra note 4, at 666---oS.
190. David J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (2001).
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arise from problems with the underlying data or the methods used to
analyze it, as already noted. 191 But even when those problems are
adequately addressed, the limits on Big Data necessarily mean that it
cannot fully replace other methods of discovering legal noncompliance,
such as individual complaints, new stories, and whistleblowers. A focus
on Big Data also could lead to the IRS and state agencies devoting even
fewer resources to providing needed guidance regarding the legal rules
applicable to nonprofits, which-particularly at the federal level-has
already declined significantly in recent years. 192
B.

Larger Concerns

Beyond inaccuracy and over-reliance concerns, other Big Data issues
raised loom quite large. These include risks to privacy, prohibited
discriminatory treatment, enhanced government power, and other
conflicts with constitutional and statutory limits on government power.
1.

Invasion of Privacy: Welcome to the Goldfish Bowl

Arguably, the greatest risk of Big Data analytics-loss of privacy-is
inapplicable to nonprofits because they are already required to publicly
disclose private information. 193 However, there are at least two privacyrelated issues. The first is the inadvertent disclosure of personal or other
sensitive information. The second is the unintended consequences of
greater access to information that comes with Big Data, including its
possible use with other data to provide a more complete profile of
individuals and other entities associated with nonprofits. 194
Privacy "encompasses not only avoiding observation, or keeping
one's personal matters and relationships secret, but also the ability to
share information selectively but not publicly." 195 The risk of Big Data is
both that nonprofits lose the ability to control data about themselves and
that no one is ultimately controlling the use of those data since it is
191. See supra Part III.
192. See Mayer, supra note 66, at 93-94.
193. See Alfred Ng, Tech 's invasion of our privacy made us more paranoid in 2018, CNET (Dec.
7, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/techs-invasion-of-our-privacy-made-us-moreparanoid-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Q6KC-5EB3]; supra notes 88, 116 and accompanying text
(public disclosure of nonprofit government filings).
194. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PREsIDENf, BIG DATA AND PRIYACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
(2014), httpsJ/ obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and
_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf[httpsJ/perma.cc/58EX-85Q6] (identifying such use as "data fusion" that "occurs
when data from different sources are brought into contact and new facts emerge").
195. /d.at2.
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readily accessible to anyone for almost any purpose. 196 Much of the
recent outrage against Facebook did not involve its use of data regarding
its users--which was presumably expected by them--but the use of its
data by others, such as Cambridge Analytica, in ways that were
unexpected. 197
As for inadvertent disclosure of personal information, this can happen
either because a nonprofit provides such information on its government
filings even though not required to do so or because a nonprofit provides
required personal information that is not subject to public disclosure but
somehow that information is in fact publicly disclosed. The first
situation has included listing the home addresses of directors, officers,
employees, grantees, or others affiliated in some way with the nonprofit,
even though the organization's address may now be provided instead,
and even listing the Social Security numbers of such individuals. 198 This
of course is an unforced error by the nonprofits involved and therefore
could be at least partially addressed by better IRS instructions and public
education. 199
The more troubling situation is when a nonprofit is required to
provide certain personal information to the IRS and that information is
publicly disclosed even though it is not supposed to be. This situation
has arisen for donor information that is not subject to public disclosure
for most tax-exempt nonprofits, with public release arising from both
IRS and nonprofit errors. 200 Some state authorities have also begun
196. See Solove, supra note 190, at 1428 ('"[C]ontrol out of control'-a situation where nobody
is exercising meaningful control over the information.").
197. Ian Sherr, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica and data mining: What you need to know, CNET
(Apr. 18, 2018, 5: IO PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-data-miningand-trump-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/NX6Q-A58Y].
198. See Noelle Barton, Many Nonprofits Include Social Security Numbers on Public Documents,
Study Finds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/ManyNonprofit-Documents/156741 [https://perma.cc/R9BU-XWBU]. A study of Form 990 filings from
2001 to 2006 found that more than 132,000 nonprofits had included at least one social security
number on that form. Id.; Christopher Quay, Changes, New Schedule to Draft Redesign Form 990
Coming, Official Says, TAXNOTESTODAY I (Nov. 19,2007).
199. See, e.g., IRS, supra note 46, at 2 ("Reminder: Don't Include Social Security Numbers on
Publicly Disclosed Forms") (emphasis omitted).
200. See, e.g., Mark J. Fitzgibbons, Oklahoma Secretary of State "Doxxes" O'Keefe Donors, THE
DAILY CALLER (Dec. 19, 2017, 2:48 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/12/19/oklahoma-secretaryof-state-doxxes-okeefe-donors/ [https://perma.cc/J9FC-DF2Q] (reporting that a nonprofit failed to
redact donor information when it filed a copy of its IRS return with a state agency that released all
nonprofit filings to the public); Tom Metcalf, A Peek Into Goldman's Black Box Charity Reveals
Tech
Billionaires,
BLOOMBERG
(Mar.
14,
2018,
1:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-14/peek-into-goldman-s-black-box-charityreveals-tech-billionaires [https://perma.cc/DA28-LWRC] (reporting that the IRS failed to redact
donor information from a filing provided to GuideStar); Sam Stein, Mitt Romney's PAC Funded
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asking for urned.acted copies of the federal schedule that lists donor
information; while those authorities usually commit to keep the
schedules private, such requests add another possible source of
inadvertent disclosures. 201 The few press reports describing such
situations indicate that they are rare although they have attracted
congressional attention. 202 In fact, the IRS is planning to eliminate the
requirement that non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits provide donor
information to the IRS in part because of these concems. 203
The increasing ease of access to return and other information relating
to nonprofits raises a subtler, but potentially greater, privacy concern.
One aspect of Big Data is the growing ability to connect multiple
datasets in order to discover patterns or other information that is not
apparent by analyzing only one of the datasets in isolation. Say a
nonprofit reports-as it is required to do--its compensation for various
officers and other highly paid employees. Most people, at least in the
United States, view compensation information as private and only to be
shared selectively with others. Senior employees and officers of taxexempt nonprofits hopefully know that as a consequence of their
employer's favorable tax status their compensation will be publicly
revealed. But what they might not expect is that a private company could
obtain this publicly available data and connect those data with its
existing database of potential customer profiles, for which compensation
Anti-Gay Marriage Group Under The Radar, HUFFPOST: POL. BLOG (Mar. 30, 2012, I :59 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/30/mitt-romney-gay-marriage_n_l391867.html
[https://perma.cc/QL85-78SP] (reporting that donor information became public because of a leaked
IRS filing).
201. See, e.g., Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Harris, 809 F.3d 536,538 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing
the California requirement that charities submit to the Attorney General a copy of the (nonpublic)
donor information submitted to the IRS). The Single Portal could help states ensure such
information remains private by establishing a uniform process for handling the donor schedules.
202. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Trey Gowdy et al., to David J. Kautter, Assistant Sec'y
for Tax Policy (June 27, 2018), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-0627-TG-JJ-MM-to-Kautter-IRS-Schedule-B-Briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H6A-H2RQ] (discussing
how members of Congress objected to the requirement that tax-exempt nonprofits report the names
and addresses of all substantial contributors to the IRS); see also Cavanaugh et al., supra note 49, at
50-51 (outlining a TE/GE Advisory Committee recommendation to consider eliminating the
required reporting of donor information as part of expanding e-filing).
203. See Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt
Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47,447, 47,451-52 (proposed Sept. IO, 2019) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing regulations that in relevant part would eliminate the requirement that taxexempt nonprofits report the names and addresses of their contributors on their annual information
returns, other than for section 501(c)(3) organizations). The IRS could not eliminate the requirement
for charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits because that requirement is statutory. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6033(b)(5) (2012) (stating how section 501(c)(3) organizations must include in their annual
information return "the names and addresses of all substantial contributors").
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level may be an important element. Such linkages may actually be
harmful to the individuals involved if, for example, their compensation
information is used to adjust upward the prices charged to them based on
their income. However, using data in this way does not appear to be
widespread at this point, and, fortunately, there is little evidence of more
nefarious use of such data. 204 Nevertheless, the greater availability of
what many would consider sensitive, personal information may raise
concerns with those who consider working for a nonprofit. 205
2.

Prohibited Discrimination: Can Computers Be Racist?

Another prominent Big Data concern is that it could lead to
discrimination based on race, gender, or other prohibited grounds,
including inadvertently through the reproduction of existing patterns of
discrimination. 206 Countering such discrimination can be tricky, in part,
because adjusting the results of Big Data analysis to compensate for
such impacts may be technically difficult or may itself raise
discrimination concerns. 207 Obvious areas in which discrimination
concerns can arise are the criminal justice and employment contexts. For
example, a recent study found that ads for STEM jobs were less likely to
be shown to women than to men on Facebook as ads targeting women
on Facebook are more expensive. 208 But discrimination concerns can

204. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 8-13 (2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_N
onembargo_v2. pdf [https://perma.cc/9M9K-5TU7].
205. For similar concerns relating to the use of personal data to target political advertisements,
see Bethany Shiner, Big Data, Small Law: How Gaps in Regulation are Affecting Political
Campaigning Methods and the Need for Fundamental Reform, Abstract (Oct. 28, 2018),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=3274212
[https://perma.cc/UCV7-F6MV]
("[T]he law cannot adequately deal with the issues posed by the collection and use of personal data
for the design and deployment of targeted social media political campaign advertisements.").
206. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS,
OPPORTUNITY,
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
5-6
(May
2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/20 l 6_0504_data_discrimin
ation.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC2E-NDXS]; FTC, supra note 157; Solon Barocas & Andrew D.
Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673-74 (2016); Cynthia Dwork &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, and It's Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 35-36
(2013).
207. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 206, at 714- I 5.
208. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine E. Tucker, Algorithmic Bia5? An Empirical Study into Apparent
Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads, MARKETING SCI. FRONTIERS
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at httpsJ/papers.ssm.corn/so13/papers.cfin?abstract_id=2852260
(httpsJ/permacc/4PXD-CED5].
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also arise in many other situations, such as access to credit and higher
education. 209
Consider the recent Tea Party application controversy at the IRS.
While political smoke has made discerning the underlying facts difficult,
the most innocuous description of what occurred is that IRS employees,
in a good faith effort to do their jobs efficiently and effectively, chose
certain terms for their Be On the Lookout (BOLO) list that,
unintentionally, disparately impacted politically conservative applicants
by subjecting them to greater scrutiny than some other applicants. 210 The
same risk exists for the use of Big Data to select which tax -exempt
nonprofits to audit in that some algorithms might have a disparate
impact on certain types of nonprofits. For example, what if a correlation
is found between the risk of legal noncompliance and location in certain
zip codes, which happen to correspond to low-income areas? Using that
correlation to select nonprofits for audit could, unintentionally,
disparately impact nonprofits led by members of minority racial or
ethnic groups, if groups with such leaders are disproportionately based
in low income areas. Another example might be if compensation
information for nonprofit executives was used to get around laws
prohibiting inquiring about compensation history. 211 These laws are
usually justified as seeking to reduce gender disparities m
compensation. 212
Computer scientists are well aware of these possible issues and have
engaged in extensive research on possible technical fixes to address
them. 213 A number of algorithm developers have made their initial
algorithms open source so that anyone can analyze them and detect
potential discrimination issues, among other problems. 214 While this may
be less possible in the nonprofit context given the enforcement-focused

209. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING, supra note
206, at 4.
210. See Leandra Ledennan, IRS Reform: Politics As Usual?, 7 COLUM. J. TAXL. 36, 50-52 (2016).
211. See Aine Cain et al., 9 places in the US where job candidates may never have to answer the
dreaded salary question again, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. JO, 2018, 9:08 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/places-where-salary-question-banned-us-2017-10
[https://perrna.cc/2G6J-C7WS].
212. Id.
213. See FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY IN MACHINE LEARNING (FAT/ML),
SCHOLARSHIP, http://www.fatml.org/resources/relevant-scholarship [https://perma.cc/U3Y6-X4A7].
214. See, e.g., Justin Sherman, How Open Source Can Fight Algorithmic Bias, THE STARTUP
(Jan.
18,
2018),
https://medium.com/swlh/how-open-source-can-fight-algorithmic-bias836a!Oe409f9 [https://perma.cc/8ABV-8SW4] (describing the use of open source technology and
methodologies to combat data bias).
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IRS and state regulator role, the key initial requirement for addressing
such concerns is awareness that these issues can arise and a willingness
to consider how otherwise acceptable data collection and analysis
methods may, unintentionally, result in objectionable disparate impacts.
Once identified, the necessary resources must be committed to
eliminating such impacts to the degree possible.
3.

Increased Government Power: Orwell and Kafka,

With new technology comes the risk that governments may deploy
that technology to increase their power vis-a-vis the governed, especially
if existing limits on governmental power fit poorly with such
advances. 215 Big Data, with its mass collection and analysis of
information relating to the governed and their organizations, certainly
raises such concerns. 216 This concern is particularly pronounced when
government makes what Professors Ian Kerr and Jessica Earle label
"preemptive predictions;" a well-known example would be placing an
individual on the no-fly list because Big Data finds a correlation
between her attributes and the likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity
on an airplane. 217
This concern is less pronounced in the nonprofit context, however, for
at least two reasons. First, both the IRS and state authorities have
authority to open an audit or investigation of any nonprofit in their
jurisdiction for any rational reason other than reasons that are
constitutionally or otherwise legally prohibited. The one exception for
the IRS is churches, for which Congress requires specific findings to
commence an inquiry or audit. 218 But since the IRS lacks annual return
data for churches the application by the IRS of a Big Data approach to
them is not feasible at this point under any conditions. 219 Second, the
data collected and analyzed for nonprofits are usually viewed as
reasonably related to their compliance with applicable laws, although
there are occasional debates on this point with respect to certain specific
information collected. 220
215. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HAR.v. L. REV. 2296,
2297-99 (2014).
216. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 22.
217. Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens
Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 67 (2013).
218. See 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2012).
219. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Lloyd H. Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First
Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REY. 479, 479-80 & nn.1-3 (2010)
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There is, however, one issue in this regard. By asking certain
questions on the required annual information return, the IRS may
influence nonprofit behavior in a way that goes beyond what the law
requires. For example, a little over ten years ago the IRS added return
questions asking whether the nonprofit completing the return had certain
governance practices, even though federal law does not require those
specific practices. 221 Many commentators, including the TE/GE's own
Advisory Committee, worried that the IRS asking these questions would
put pressure on all nonprofits to adopt these practices even it might be
unwise for them to do so. 222 The increasing ability of both the IRS and
outside parties to search return information and identify correlations
between the answers to these governance-related questions and
compliance with federal tax law increases the risk that tax-exempt
nonprofits may feel pressured to adopt such practices not because of
their inherent value but because the lack of them might be perceived as
increasing the risk of IRS audit or adverse public attention. Similarly,
Congress has chosen to focus greater attention on charitable, tax-exempt
hospitals by requiring them to provide information regarding their
provision of certain community benefits and adoption of policies relating
to such benefits, even though current law only requires such hospitals to
provide community benefits generally, without mandating any
specifics. 223 This underlines the dynamic nature of correlations; just
asking certain questions might cause a change in behavior, which might
in turn be correlated with greater, or less, legal compliance.
If asking certain questions on the Form 990 does in fact lead to a
change in behavior, that fact could tempt the IRS or Congress to add
further questions relating to practices they deem desirable in order to
push nonprofits toward adopting them, even though such practices are
not legally required. States could engage in similar encouragement
through questions on their required registration and reporting forms. The
only apparent way to stop this increase in government power would be
for the government actors to restrain themselves from exercising their
form-drafting discretion in this manner or, to the extent this restraint is
(discussing a disagreement over federal role in nonprofit governance, including collecting information
regarding governance practices); Fred Stokeld, IRS Drops Donor Disclosure Requirements, 82 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 113 (2018) (disagreement over need to collect donor information).
221. See Bonnie S. Brier et al., The Appropriate Role of the Internal Revenue Service With
Respect To Tax-Exempt Organization Good Governance Issues, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX
EXEMPT AND GoVERNMENT ENTITIES (ACT) REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 46 (2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p4344--2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/6US2-4 WZ7].
222. See id.; Mayer & Wilson, supra note 220, at 480 n.3 (other critics).
223. See 26 U.S.C. § 50l(r) (2012); Rev. Ru!. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
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lacking at the agency level, for the relevant legislature to forbid them
from doing so.
4.

Other Legal Limits: Building a Plane While You Are Flying

Commonly cited constitutional limitations on government deployment
of Big Data are the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment's limits on searches and seizures, and the due
process obligations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 224 The
protections provided by these provisions are related in part, but not
entirely, to the privacy concerns discussed above. 225 There are few, if
any, statutory or other legal limitations specifically targeting government
use of Big Data methods. 226 In the federal tax context, the IRS is limited
by generally applicable taxpayer privacy requirements, except for
information Congress has explicitly made subject to public disclosure. 227
It is also limited by third party contact rules. 228
Government use of Big Data implicates the First Amendment if such
use places burdens on free speech, including but not limited to impairing
the ability of individuals to speak anonymously, to associate with others
without public disclosure, or to make intimate decisions without
government interference, all of which are aspects of privacy. 229 It also
implicates the Fourth Amendment to the extent the collection and use of
personal data without the knowledge and consent of the affected

224. See MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PRNACY PROTECTIONS 7-11 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance
State, 93 MINN. L. REV. I, 19-23 (2008); Ian Kerr, Predication, Preemption, Presumption: The
Path of Law After the Computational Tum, in PRIYACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL
TuRN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 91, 108 (Mireille
Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013).
225. See KUHN, supra note 224, at 11-12 (different conceptualizations of privacy).
226. The most prominent federal guidance appears to be the Federal Trade Commission's nonbinding "Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace" set of guidelines relating to
consumer-oriented commercial Internet sites. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRNACY ONLINE: FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practiceselectronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5TAY8K7].
227. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).
228. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2012).
229. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); KUHN,
supra note 224, at 51-76.
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individuals is a search or seizure in the Fourth Amendment sense. 230
Finally such use implicates the due process requirements of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the extent that Big Data methods infringe on
the life, liberty (including with respect to privacy), or property of
individuals and their associations. 231
In the nonprofit context, these constitutional concerns are muted but
not completely absent. As already noted, privacy is not as obviously a
pressing concern for nonprofits as it is in most other areas because
almost all of the data at issue are already required by law to be publicly
disclosed. 232 But the possible use of Big Data methods to reveal
connections involving individuals still has privacy implications, and also
Big Data methods could lead to disparate impacts based on the views
expressed by nonprofits and therefore raise First Amendment concerns,
especially since it could be difficult to determine if such disparate
impacts were intentional or inadvertent.
For the data drawn from the annual information returns there are
usually no Fourth Amendment concerns because the nonprofits
themselves provide such data, as one of the conditions on the tax
benefits they receive. In the future, however, Fourth Amendment
concerns could arise for the IRS and state officials obtaining data from
other sources without the knowledge or consent of the nonprofits
involved, such as through mining social media or reading email, text, or
other communication traffic. For example, the Supreme Court recently
held that an individual has "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements as captured through [cell-site location
data]" and therefore this information is protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 233 Finally, and as Professor Danielle Keats Citron has
highlighted, any automated decisionmaking process-such as one used
to select nonprofits to audit or otherwise investigate-raises significant
due process concerns with respect to notice and the opportunity to
heard. 234 Due process concerns are heightened if an automated decision230. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S._, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217-18 (2018) (applying
the Fourth Amendment to collection of cell phone location records); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (applying the Fourth Amendment to attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle
and use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements).
231. See KUHN, supra note 224, at 200--01 (discussing due process and privacy as knowledge control).
232. See supra notes 88, 116 and accompanying text (discussing public disclosure of nonprofit
government filings). Improper disclosure of the limited information that is not supposed to be
subject to public disclosure appears to be relatively rare. See supra note 200 (outlining instances of
improper disclosure).
233. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
234. Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249, 1281-88 (2008).
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making process results in reflexive imposition of some type of penalty,
such as revocation of tax-exempt status or a cease-and-desist order
relating to charitable solicitation. At this point, however, no government
regulator of nonprofits appears be going beyond audit selection based
solely on algorithmic results.
While statutory or other legal limitations targeted specifically at Big
Data methods do not exist at either the federal or state level, the IRS is
subject to general taxpayer privacy and third party contact rules that may
be implicated by the collection and analysis of data. 235 To maintain
taxpayer privacy, the IRS is prohibited from publicly disclosing which
specific tax-exempt nonprofits it is auditing or even the results of such
audits unless the audit leads to revocation of tax exemption. 236 This
limitation hinders the ability of outside parties to evaluate the
effectiveness of the IRS' s selection processes for audits, including any
Big Data methods used. As for third party contacts where the IRS is
inquiring about a specific individual or other entity to learn information
relevant to tax liability, the IRS as a matter of practice seeks to obtain
the desired information from the audit target, such as a tax -exempt
nonprofit, before contacting a third party. 237 It is not clear, however, that
this limitation would apply to a general request for information relating
to multiple tax-exempt nonprofits, such as a broad request for social
media data. This is because the IRS Internal Revenue Manual provides
that the definition of third-party contacts does not include "[s]earches
made on computer databases that do not require any personal
involvement on the other end." 238 This exception might apply to at least
some broad inquiries because the IRS may be able to draw information
from some commercial databases to which it gains access through
inquiries that are mediated solely by the computers that store the
databases and so do not involve any human beings outside of the agency.
The uncertainty regarding whether and how the constitutional
limitations and the applicable statutory limitations apply to Big Data
collection and analysis mean that nonprofits subject to Big Data methods
may face a costly and risky battle if they choose to challenge the actions
of the IRS based on any of these other legal limits. It took congressional
attention to end the IRS tactic of reading emails of taxpayers without
235. See supra notes 225-228 and accompanying text.
236. See 26 U.S.C. §§6103(a), (bX2)(A) (2012); Revocations of 50l(c)(3) Detenninations, INTERNAL
REvENuE SERv., httpsJ/www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/revocations-of-501 c3deterrninations [httpsJ/perma.cc/7B:X:X-RYFF].
237. I.R.S. Notification Requirements, IRM 25.27.1.3(1) (Oct. 19, 2017).
238. ld. at 25.27.1.2(2)(a).
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consent, notice, or court permission. 239 It may therefore take concerted
action by umbrella organizations, including through calling for
congressional action when warranted, to fully apply these limits to the
use of Big Data methods with respect to nonprofits.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the steps that government agencies and private parties
have taken to apply Big Data methods to overseeing and studying
nonprofits, along with the promises and perils that doing so present,
there are several recommendations that regulators, researchers, and
nonprofits should consider. For agencies and legislatures, continued
pursuit of these methods is clearly desirable, but specific steps must be
taken to rigorously evaluate their effectiveness and to avoid the potential
perils they present. For researchers, the easier access to much greater
amounts of data relating to nonprofits must be tempered by recognition
of those data's limitations and the possible effects such research could
have on nonprofits. And for nonprofits, they must complete their
government filings with the knowledge that ever-greater numbers of
people will be accessing them and also the awareness that other, publicly
accessible information such as their websites and social media presences
may be compared with those filings for consistency and completeness.
A.

For Regulators

Given the acknowledged resource limitations faced by the IRS and
state agencies when it comes to overseeing nonprofits, it is imperative
that they continue to leverage the technological advantages that a Big
Data approach to such oversight provides if they can do so cost
effectively. 240 At the same time, and as the IRS has acknowledged, not
every algorithm will prove effective and efficient in identifying

239. See Houser & Sanders, supra note 28, at 823, 823 n.31 (citing Tim Sampson, IRS Reverses
Course
on
Warrantless
Email
Snooping,
DAILY
DOT,
(Apr.
17,
2013),
https://www.dailydot.com/news/irs-email-warrantless-snooping-reversal/ [https://perma.cc/2UTKUQNE]).
240. See supra section II.A (resource limitations). This recommendation assumes that a Big Data
approach would allow regulators to do more with their existing, limited resources even given the
technological challenges of implementing this approach, which assumption is generally consistent
with the views of commentators. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 3738 ("Big data holds enormous power to make the provision of services more efficient across the
entire spectrum of government activity .... "); MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (predicting
"that we will, at some point, see investments in big-data-related capital deepening pay off in the
form of productivity gains").
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nonprofits that are likely out of compliance with the applicable law. 241
This is particularly true given the possible accuracy issues with both the
underlying data and the tools used to analysis them. 242 It is therefore
important that the agencies themselves rigorously evaluate whether the
specific methods chosen are significantly more effective at detecting
noncompliance as compared to other, non-Big Data approaches, and that
independent oversight entities such as the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration also do so. 243 The IRS has stated that it continues to
rely heavily on its "robust referral process" to identify noncompliance,
along with more data-driven methods. 244 There may also be a role for
outside researchers in this regard, as detailed in the next section,
although that role is necessarily limited by the need for such agencies to
limit public access to the criteria used to identify nonprofits that are
likely to be violating the applicable laws. 245
Regulators may also have to consider making more efforts to ensure
that government filings are accurate. In theory, inaccuracies can result in
an IRS return being treated as incomplete, triggering late filing
penalties. 246 Inaccuracies can also theoretically result in a perjury
conviction for the nonprofit leader who signs the retum. 247 However, it
is, at best, unclear how often the IRS imposes penalties for inaccurate
information. 248 While in early 2018 the IRS implemented a new process
for rejecting incomplete or incorrect paper-filed Form 990s, leading to
an over 10% rejection rate, it is unclear what other steps the IRS has

241. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of approach used
to try to identify noncompliant private foundations).
242. See supra sections lll.A. l, III.A.2.
243. See
About
TIGTA,
TREASURY
INSPECTOR
GEN.
FOR
TAX
ADMIN.,
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/JF5W-8A7Z] (noting their mission to
"[p ]rovide quality, professional audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation services that
promote integrity, economy, and efficiency in the administration of the Nation's tax system").
244. Von Lienen, supra note 44.
245. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
246. See 26 U.S.C. § 6652(c)(l)(ii) (2012) (stating that an excise tax can be imposed on a taxexempt nonprofit for "a failure to include any of the information required to be shown on [an annual
information return] ... or to show the correct information").
247. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (creating a felony for willfully making and subscribing any return that
contains a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury if the person doing so
does not believe the return to be true and correct as to every material matter); IRS, 2018 FORM 990
supra note 50, at 1 (stating that a signature is made "[u]nder penalties of perjury").
248. See IRS, supra note 47, at 42-43 & n.14 (reporting the assessment of approximately 54,000
"daily delinquency'' penalties, totaling approximately $177 million, but indicating such penalties are
primarily for failures to file).
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taken to improve return accuracy. 249 To the extent the IRS's Big Data
approaches rely primarily if not almost exclusively on annual
information return data, the IRS should consider increasing the
frequency of penalties when it discovers significant inaccuracies in such
returns. State agencies should also consider similar measures for their
required filings.
These points are of course obvious and appear to have already been
embraced at least in part by at least the IRS. What is less obvious, but
also should be considered by these agencies, is the extent to which Big
Data approaches implicate the larger concerns identified above. 250 More
specifically, for privacy, IRS and state agencies need to consider what if
any steps they should take to prevent personal information that is not
required to be included in government filings, but that nonprofits
inadvertently provide, from becoming publicly available. The IRS has in
fact already taken at least one step in this regard, in that it removes
social security numbers from e-filed Forms 990 before providing that
information to Amazon Web Services. 251 However, it acknowledged that
it does not identify or redact other personally identifiable information
such as home addresses and the ages of students receiving
scholarships. 252
The IRS and state agencies also have to be sensitive to the possibility
that methods chosen may have unintentional but undesirable
discriminatory effects. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued
a report highlighting these concerns for private actors and Big Data,
noting that to address this potential requires considering whether a data
set is representative, whether a data model accounts for possible
improper biases, how accurate predications based on Big Data actually
are, and the appropriate balance between predictive accuracy and
fairness considerations. 253 Similar considerations need to reflected in
evaluations of Big Data methods adopted to help oversee nonprofits. The
last point is especially important, because even an algorithm that is
highly successful in detecting legal noncompliance may have to be set
aside if its results also are fundamentally unfair in that they

249. See Von Lienen, supra note 44.
250. See supra section III.B.
251. Transcript of Webcast with Sunita Lough, Insights into the IR.S's New Data-Driven
Approach to Examining Tax-Exempt Organizations (Part 1) (Oct. 11, 2017), in EO TAX J. 2017220 (Nov. 10, 2017).
252. Id.
253. FTC, supra note 157, at iv-v.
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disproportionately identify noncompliance within, for example,
organizations with a particular ideological bent.
Concerns about government overreach, including possibly implicating
constitutional and statutory limitations, should also temper proposals
either to expand the information collected on required government
filings or to gather information from external sources. The latter is of
particular concern, given that the Congress has already chastised the IRS
for obtaining information such as emails in possible violation of
constitutional limitations. 254 The IRS and state agencies should therefore
be sure to measure such data gathering against such legal limitations.
Congress and state legislatures also have a role that goes beyond
overseeing the IRS and state agencies, respectively, in the areas already
detailed. First and most obviously, they can mandate electronic filing of
government forms required from nonprofits, thereby easing access to the
information on such forms for the agencies and, if released, researchers
and other private parties. This is particularly important given that
organizations seeking to avoid regulatory and public scrutiny may
increasingly avoid e-filing as access to e-filed returns increases, unless
e-filing is mandatory. Congress has in fact recently imposed mandatory
e-filing for tax-exempt nonprofits. 255
Congress and state legislatures also could take steps to address some
of the larger concerns identified above. One step Congress should take is
to enact a prohibition on private parties using individual informationsuch as compensation-provided on nonprofit returns for commercial
purposes, to address the privacy concern raised by the reporting and
disclosure of such information. 256 This is not unprecedented, as in other
contexts where individuals are subject to public financial disclosures
because of their affiliation with a particular type of organization or
government position, Congress has prohibited the sale or use of
information regarding these individuals for any commercial purpose. 257
At least one such rule has survived constitutional challenge. 258 Congress
254. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
257. See 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 105(c)(l)(B) (2012) (information for senior government officials
contained in ethics reports); 52 U.S.C. § 30l l l(a)(4) (2012) (information for contributors to
candidates, political parties, and political committee); II C.F.R. § 104.15 (2019) (same); Sale or
Use of Contributor Information, FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, https://www.fec.gov/updates/saleor-use-contributor-information/ [https://perma.cc/ND7Z-DJF2] (same).
258. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Int'! Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en bane)
(rejecting both a facial and an as applied challenge to 52 U.S.C. § 301 l l(a)(4) under the First
Amendment).
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and state legislatures could also be the appropriate venues for
considering whether certain agency practices may come too close to or
even cross constitutional and other legal limits, thereby possibly
avoiding lengthy and expensive litigation.
B.

For Researchers

Some researchers, both in the law and in other disciplines, have
already started working with the existing and growing databases of
government-collected information relating to nonprofits. 259 As the
amount and visibility of these data grows, presumably this group will
also grow. This is a welcome development, as the resources and interests
of government agencies are very limited, while private researchers
should be able to tap additional funding sources and analyze important
issues that may not attract agency attention. 260 In fact, at least one IRS
official has encouraged feedback from private researchers. 261
That said, researchers must be wary of at least two significant pitfalls.
The first and most obvious one is the accuracy of the underlying data. As
noted above, there are indications that at least the annual information
returns filed with the IRS may contain significant inaccuracies for many
nonprofits, particularly with respect to information that has public
relations or rating implications. 262 While it may be difficult to identify,
much less correct, such inaccuracies, researchers should be sensitive to
how such inaccuracies may affect their results. When possible, they also
should seek other sources of information to corroborate and correct IRSprovided data as necessary.
The second and less obvious one is the so-called "streetlight effect,"
based on the story of the drunk looking for their keys under the
streetlight even though they lost them elsewhere because "the light is
better."263 The currently available machine-readable data is limited in at
259. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
260. Jes.5e Lecy, Nathan Grasse & Leonor Camarena, Do Female Board Members Reduce the Gender Pay
Gap for Nonprofit Managers?, Panel at the fut'! Soc'y for Third-Sector Res. Conference (July 10-13, 2018),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.istr.org/resomce/resmgr/amsterdam/program.final_6. l2.18.pdf
[https://perrna.cc/G2MH-MTIIK] (discussing gender differences in compensation).
261. See Lough, supra note 45 (inviting the public to look at the IRS-related e-filing data and
"tell us what they're seeing").
262. See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text.
263. See Jake Linford, Datamining the Meaning(s) ofProgress, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1531, 1554 n.121
("[u]sing inapplicable but easily accessible data can contnbute to behavior based on bad infonnation,
triggering a 'streetlight' effect''); David H. Freedman, Why Scientific Studies Are So Often Wrong: The
Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER (July-Aug. 2010), http://discovermagazine.com/2010/jul-aug/29-whyscientific-studies-often-wrong-streetlight-effect [https://permacc/3WES-MJ2F].
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least three important ways, each of which could cause researchers to
unduly focus on certain aspects of the nonprofit sector or try to draw
inappropriate conclusions from these limited data. One limitation is that
the comprehensive IRS annual information return data only includes
recently e-filed returns, although the NCCS databases provide older data
for a limited set of fields from all returns. 264 Use of these data therefore
is not fully representative of the nonprofit sector of a whole and also
only provides a limited historical perspective.
Another limitation is that the annual information returns
understandably focus primarily on financial data and on certain
information relating to specific legal requirements. This makes them a
rich source of information for legal and financial researchers but limits
their usefulness for other purposes. For example, researchers interested
in exploring the relative impacts of various nonprofits will likely find
little information to assist in their efforts. Or worse, they may try to draw
inappropriate conclusions from the data available-as is often the
criticism made of rating agencies and others that rely heavily on
administrative and fundraising to programmatic cost ratios. 265
A third limitation involves organizations that either are permitted to
file less lengthy annual information returns or are entirely exempted
from filing any such returns. The former are usually limited to nonprofits
that are smaller financially, which may make them less important for
some but not all research purposes. 266 The latter include most notably
churches and church-related entities, but also include, among other
entities, public colleges and universities. 267 So a researcher interested in
higher education would find the data they obtained from the IRS filings
to be missing this important portion of that sector.
None of these limitations necessarily undermine the usefulness of the
increasingly available data regarding nonprofits, but they must be
considered when designing research projects in order to avoid both
misleading conclusions and neglect of certain aspects of the nonprofit
sector. Because of these limitations, researchers who want to analyze
issues not fully supported by the existing data will need to consider
gathering data from other sources to address these representational and
264. See supra notes 54, 94 and accompanying text.
265. See Overhead Ratios Are Essential for Informed Giving, CHARITY WATCH,
https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/overhead-ratios-are-essential-for-informedgiving/133 [https://perma.cc/6RQB-WQG9] (summarizing the debate relating to using such ratios to
evaluate charities while defending their use).
266. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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other concerns. A related concern is that by focusing on certain reported
information, such as fundraising ratios, researchers may actually
influence nonprofit behavior, at least for those nonprofits sensitive to
how they are portrayed by researchers.
C.

For Nonprofits

Finally, the nonprofits subject to the increasingly Big Data focused
scrutiny of regulators and researchers need to consider how best to adapt
to this change. First and most obviously, while the public nature of IRS
annual information returns has long made them public relations
documents as well as government filings, the increased access those
returns and the data they contain only further emphasizes their public
relations role. Particularly for nonprofits that depend on having a strong
public reputation, ensuring that their returns both accurately and
positively reflect their finances and activities will become even more
important. This is in addition to ensuring that information that is
sensitive and not required to be provided, such as home addresses of
board members or social security numbers of employees, is not included
in the returns.
But even for nonprofits that are less sensitive to public perceptions,
perhaps because they depend primarily on government contracts or a
single donor for revenues, the increased access to their government
filings could become problematic if those filings are not consistent with
information in other databases, such as federal grant audit results, or
other publicly available information sources, such as social media. For
example, a state political organization filing revealed a donation by the
Donald J. Trump Foundation to that organization even though the
Foundation was prohibited from making such contributions by federal
tax law and had, inaccurately, reported the grant as having been made to
a similarly named but different, non-political organization on the
Foundation's IRS annual information return. 268 While that revelation did
not prevent Donald Trump's election, it did create some negative
publicity and forced him to both correct the expenditure, presumably by
reimbursing the Foundation, and pay a penalty tax to the IRS on behalf
268. Letter from Noah Bookbinder, Exec. Dir., Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington, to John A. Koskinen, IRS Comrn'r (Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing how a Florida
campaign finance filing by recipient political organization revealed donation from Foundation); see
Allison Graves, Donald Trump, Pam Bondi and $25K: Was it pay to play?, POLITIFACT FLA. (Sept.
21, 2016, 5 :53 PM), https://www.politifact.com/florida/article/2016/sep/2 l/donald-trump-pambondi-and-25k-was-it-pay-play/ [https://perma.cc/P2JW-V82S] (discussing the inaccurate reporting
of donation on Foundation IRS annual return).
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of the Foundation. 269 As it becomes easier for not just regulators and
academic researchers but also reporters, critics, and other members of
the public to connect the dots of publicly available nonprofit
information, ensuring that such issues do not arise will become
increasingly important for most nonprofits.
CONCLUSION

In the United States and elsewhere, government regulators and
interested private parties are starting to tum toward Big Data-the
collection of enormous amounts of digital data analyzed with
sophisticated machine learning tools-to better oversee and understand
nonprofits. One of the advantages of being relatively late to adopt a Big
Data approach is the ability to take advantage of the now significant
amount of thought given to how such an approach can best enhance such
oversight and what risks such an approach may present.
Big Data may allow government regulators to deploy their limited
resources in a much more efficient manner and to more effectively fulfill
their oversight roles, which is very much needed given longstanding
resource constraints. That said, to fully realize these promises, regulators
and others must rigorously test the methods applied to determine
whether and to what extent they improve efficiency and effectiveness of
government oversight. It is not yet clear whether either the IRS or state
regulators are committed to such rigorous review, although the IRS has
indicated it has taken some steps along these lines. To the extent legally
and pragmatically permissible, regulators should also make their
methods visible to internal and external evaluators so as to enhance this
review and at the same time minimize the perils posed by using Big Data
techniques.
As for those perils, regulators and private parties must be conscious of
the limitations on the data available to them, in terms of accuracy and
comprehensiveness, and on the analytical tools they employ. They must
not forego the continued use of other methods to help compensate for
these limitations. However, they must also be alert to the possibility that
Big Data may lead to unintentional invasions of privacy, have prohibited
disparate impacts, create temptations to increase government power
beyond legislative mandates or infringe other legal limits. They must
therefore establish procedures to detect and counter such possibilities if
they arise. Fortunately, there is time to put such procedures in place at

269. See Graves, supra note 268.
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both the federal and state level, but this task must be considered an
integral part of establishing a Big Data approach and not just an
afterthought. If it is, then the perils of Big Data are likely to be avoided
while its promises are fulfilled for the regulation of nonprofits.

